.FFI explains al-Qaida document
Since the Madrid bombings on 11 March there has been considerable media interest in a document found on radical islamist websites some months ago by researchers at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI).
The document recommends "painful strikes" against Spanish "forces" specifically around the time of the Spanish elections and there has naturally been much speculation about the relationship between this text and the Madrid events.
Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer now present some clarifications and reflections on the significance of the 42-page Arabic document called "Jihadi Iraq, Hopes and Dangers".
Date and origin of the document
According to the author, a provisional draft of the document was finished in September 2003, but it was not published until approximately 10 December. FFI’s Brynjar Lia came across the document in December on website called "Global Islamic Media" which regularly posts various kinds of radical islamist texts. Lia then skimmed the document and interpreted it as a strategy document intended for the islamist resistance within Iraq.
However, just after the Madrid bombings Brynjar Lia recalled the document and started analysing it in more detail with his colleague Thomas Hegghammer. The detailed reading provided many interesting new insights, particularly when coupled with details from the investigation of the Madrid attacks.
Authorship and audience
According to the heading of the document, it was prepared by the "Media Committee for the Victory of the Iraqi People (Mujahidin Services Centre)". This entity is previously unknown, but the reference to a "services centre" (markaz al-khidamat) echoes the "Services Bureau" (maktab al-khidamat), the organisation from which al-Qaida grew in the late 1980s. The document is written by a single person whose name does not appear anywhere in the document. However, the text contains a dedication to Yusuf al-Ayiri and several quotations from his books.
Yusuf al-Ayiri was a key al-Qaida ideologist and media coordinator who was killed by Saudi security forces in May 2003. The fact that al-Ayiri is the only named person to receive a dedication in the document, and the fact that the author strongly recommends reading al-Ayiri’s books indicate that the author was either part of the circle around al-Ayiri, or would like to be associated with his ideological legacy. Al-Ayiri wrote extensively on the Iraq war and his style was characterized by a very pragmatic military and political approach to jihad. His books paid little attention to religious and theological issues.
Jihadi Iraq, Hopes and Dangers is similarly pragmatic and analytical, and this further suggest that the author is at least of the same ideological orientation of al-Ayiri, who was closely associated with al-Qaida. At several points in the text the author says "we think" or "we find", suggesting perhaps that the "Mujahidin Services Centre" does indeed refer to a closed circle of al-Qaida followers.
The document is also dedicated more generally to islamists who have fought in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia and Iraq. This indicates that the text is not intended for internal organisational use but rather seeks to provide general strategic advice to a wider international audience of radical islamists. At the same time, the author presumes that the readers share his underlying ideological vision, because he does not deal with theological justifications for the strategy he proposes.
Like al-Ayiri, the author sees no reason to spend time preaching to the choir about the need to wage jihad against the crusaders. He cuts straight to the crucial issue, namely how should the Mujahidin proceed in practical terms in order to oust the occupation forces from Iraq ? Thus he remains faithful to the subtitle of the document: "(A review of) the practical steps for the blessed jihad".
Major themes
The main thesis proposed in the document is that America cannot be coerced to leave Iraq by military-political means alone, but the Islamist resistance can succeed if it makes the occupation of Iraq as costly as possible - in economic terms - for the United States.
The document therefore offers a number of specific "policy recommendations" in order to increase the economic impact of the insurgency and the jihadi campaign in Iraq. The most important of these recommendations consists of trying to limit the number of American allies present in Iraq, because America must not be allowed to share the cost of occupation with a wide coalition of countries. If the mujahidin can force US allies to withdraw from Iraq then America will be left to cover the expenses on her own, which she cannot sustain for very long. The intermediary strategic goal is therefore to make one or two of the US allies leave the coalition, because this will cause others to follow suit and the dominos will start falling.
The document then analyses three countries (Britain, Spain and Poland) in depth, with a view to identifying the weakest link or the domino piece most likely to fall first. The author provides a surprisingly informed and nuanced analysis of the domestic political map in each country. He argues that each country will react differently to violent attacks against its forces because of domestic political factors:
Poland, for example, is unlikely to withdraw from the coalition because there is political consensus on foreign policy, and the country has a very high tolerance for human casualties.
Britain is easier to force out of Iraq, because the popular opposition to the war and the occupation is so high. However, the author estimates that Britain will only withdraw from Iraq in one of two cases: either if Britain suffers significant human casualties in Iraq or if Spain and Italy withdraws first.
Spain on the other hand is very vulnerable to attacks on its forces, primarily because public opposition to the war is almost total, and the government is virtually on its own on this issue. The author therefore identifies Spain as the weakest link in the coalition.
References to Spain
The author devotes 6 out of 42 pages to a review of the domestic political situation in Spain. In the process he displays a knowledge of and interest in Spanish society which is striking. We do not know whether the author himself has intimate knowledge of Spanish politics or whether he is plagiarising good secondary sources. However, the very fact that he deems such a high level of detail necessary for his argument indicates that we are dealing with a politically very developed mind. It must also be noted that of the three case studies, the chapter on Spain is by far the best in terms of analytical clarity.
The most interesting passage of the whole text is the author’s concluding remarks regarding Spain:
"Aznar’s position does not express the Spanish popular stance, and if the disparity between the government and the people were at the same percentage rate in Britain, then the government would fall. But this has not happened thus far, for a number of reasons, including:
- That the Spanish people, despite the passing of more than quarter of a century of democracy, has not reached the level of e.g. Britain in terms of accountability of its rulers. So far it (the people) has accepted the lies of the politicians as the truth and it does not see a reason for holding them accountable. This is contrary to the British who try to hold Blair accountable for his lies in making a case for Britain’s entry in the war on Iraq.
- That most of the rightist electorate are very loyal to their party. Despite the fact that the vast majority of the Spanish opposed the war, in the last local elections the Popular party electorate voted for their party and remained loyal to it.
- The power of the group Opus Dei in the Popular Party..
- The lack of direct influence of the Iraq events on life in Spain...
- The weakness of the leftist opposition and the failure of mounting a political struggle.
Therefore we say that in order to force the Spanish government to withdraw from Iraq the resistance should deal painful blows to its forces. This should be accompanied by an information campaign clarifying the truth of the matter inside Iraq. It is necessary to make utmost use of the upcoming general election in Spain in March next year.
We think that the Spanish government could not tolerate more than two, maximum three blows, after which it will have to withdraw as a result of popular pressure. If its troops still remain in Iraq after these blows, then the victory of the Socialist Party is almost secured, and the withdrawal of the Spanish forces will be on its electoral programme.
Lastly, we are emphasise that a withdrawal of the Spanish or Italian forces from Iraq would put huge pressure on the British presence (in Iraq), a pressure that Toni Blair might not be able to withstand, and hence the domino tiles would fall quickly. Yet, the basic problem of making the first tile fall still remains."
(The passage is underlined and in bold types in the Arabic original)
Relationship with the Madrid events
The document’s significance derives first of all from the way in which it might be linked to the Madrid events. FFI’s researchers think it is likely that the perpetrators of the attacks knew this document in some way or other. There are three reasons for this.
First of all, the document highlights Spain as the politically most convenient target of the coalition countries present in Iraq, and it specifically mentions the Spanish elections as a good time to strike.
Second, the recommendation to strike Spanish forces does not exclude attacks on other types of Spanish targets in other parts of the world. The perpetrators may have adopted the overall strategy outlined in the document while altering the tactics somewhat and taking the campaign onto Spanish territory. After all, the author makes a point out of the fact that the Iraq war has so far not affected life in Spain ("..lack of direct influence of the Iraq events on life in Spain"). Moreover, the fact that the document is addressed to global jihadists, and that it was posted on the "Global Islamic Media" website indicates that its scope went way beyond the Iraqi battlefield.
Third, the man who assumes responsibility for the attacks appears on a video under the name Abu Dujana al-Afghani, echoing a reference to the historical Abu Dujana on page 2 of the document, which goes as follows: "Verily (the crusaders) do not and will not be turned away (from aggression against Islam) except by the youth who have sold their souls to God Almighty, and who have put on the headband of death ... the headband of Abu Dujana".
Abu Dujana was one of the companions of the Prophet Muhammad and known as a brave fighter. His trademark was a red headband known as the "headband of death" (‘asbat al-mawt), which he wound around his helmet before going into battle. For this reason "Abu Dujana" has sometimes been used as an alias by mujahidin in various parts of the world. In this case, however, we cannot exclude the possibility that the person on the videotape has chosen the alias Abu Dujana after reading this document. Alternatively, perhaps it is the author who deliberately hints at the Moroccan-Spanish cell by mentioning Abu Dujana.
One must always be very careful to link anonymous ideological texts with specific events on the ground, especially when the texts contain few operational details. One by one, the abovementioned the points of convergence are not enough to link the document to the attacks. However, when the indications are considered as a whole and coupled with details from the investigation such as the videotape, a very interesting picture emerges. This leads us to suggest that we are dealing with a text which served as ideological inspiration and policy guidance for the terrorist attacks in Madrid.
FFI
Well there it is. Talk about Clinton having something and not doing nothing about it, well? Do I have to spell it out here.
The document recommends "painful strikes" against Spanish "forces" specifically around the time of the Spanish elections and there has naturally been much speculation about the relationship between this text and the Madrid events.
Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer now present some clarifications and reflections on the significance of the 42-page Arabic document called "Jihadi Iraq, Hopes and Dangers".
Date and origin of the document
According to the author, a provisional draft of the document was finished in September 2003, but it was not published until approximately 10 December. FFI’s Brynjar Lia came across the document in December on website called "Global Islamic Media" which regularly posts various kinds of radical islamist texts. Lia then skimmed the document and interpreted it as a strategy document intended for the islamist resistance within Iraq.
However, just after the Madrid bombings Brynjar Lia recalled the document and started analysing it in more detail with his colleague Thomas Hegghammer. The detailed reading provided many interesting new insights, particularly when coupled with details from the investigation of the Madrid attacks.
Authorship and audience
According to the heading of the document, it was prepared by the "Media Committee for the Victory of the Iraqi People (Mujahidin Services Centre)". This entity is previously unknown, but the reference to a "services centre" (markaz al-khidamat) echoes the "Services Bureau" (maktab al-khidamat), the organisation from which al-Qaida grew in the late 1980s. The document is written by a single person whose name does not appear anywhere in the document. However, the text contains a dedication to Yusuf al-Ayiri and several quotations from his books.
Yusuf al-Ayiri was a key al-Qaida ideologist and media coordinator who was killed by Saudi security forces in May 2003. The fact that al-Ayiri is the only named person to receive a dedication in the document, and the fact that the author strongly recommends reading al-Ayiri’s books indicate that the author was either part of the circle around al-Ayiri, or would like to be associated with his ideological legacy. Al-Ayiri wrote extensively on the Iraq war and his style was characterized by a very pragmatic military and political approach to jihad. His books paid little attention to religious and theological issues.
Jihadi Iraq, Hopes and Dangers is similarly pragmatic and analytical, and this further suggest that the author is at least of the same ideological orientation of al-Ayiri, who was closely associated with al-Qaida. At several points in the text the author says "we think" or "we find", suggesting perhaps that the "Mujahidin Services Centre" does indeed refer to a closed circle of al-Qaida followers.
The document is also dedicated more generally to islamists who have fought in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia and Iraq. This indicates that the text is not intended for internal organisational use but rather seeks to provide general strategic advice to a wider international audience of radical islamists. At the same time, the author presumes that the readers share his underlying ideological vision, because he does not deal with theological justifications for the strategy he proposes.
Like al-Ayiri, the author sees no reason to spend time preaching to the choir about the need to wage jihad against the crusaders. He cuts straight to the crucial issue, namely how should the Mujahidin proceed in practical terms in order to oust the occupation forces from Iraq ? Thus he remains faithful to the subtitle of the document: "(A review of) the practical steps for the blessed jihad".
Major themes
The main thesis proposed in the document is that America cannot be coerced to leave Iraq by military-political means alone, but the Islamist resistance can succeed if it makes the occupation of Iraq as costly as possible - in economic terms - for the United States.
The document therefore offers a number of specific "policy recommendations" in order to increase the economic impact of the insurgency and the jihadi campaign in Iraq. The most important of these recommendations consists of trying to limit the number of American allies present in Iraq, because America must not be allowed to share the cost of occupation with a wide coalition of countries. If the mujahidin can force US allies to withdraw from Iraq then America will be left to cover the expenses on her own, which she cannot sustain for very long. The intermediary strategic goal is therefore to make one or two of the US allies leave the coalition, because this will cause others to follow suit and the dominos will start falling.
The document then analyses three countries (Britain, Spain and Poland) in depth, with a view to identifying the weakest link or the domino piece most likely to fall first. The author provides a surprisingly informed and nuanced analysis of the domestic political map in each country. He argues that each country will react differently to violent attacks against its forces because of domestic political factors:
Poland, for example, is unlikely to withdraw from the coalition because there is political consensus on foreign policy, and the country has a very high tolerance for human casualties.
Britain is easier to force out of Iraq, because the popular opposition to the war and the occupation is so high. However, the author estimates that Britain will only withdraw from Iraq in one of two cases: either if Britain suffers significant human casualties in Iraq or if Spain and Italy withdraws first.
Spain on the other hand is very vulnerable to attacks on its forces, primarily because public opposition to the war is almost total, and the government is virtually on its own on this issue. The author therefore identifies Spain as the weakest link in the coalition.
References to Spain
The author devotes 6 out of 42 pages to a review of the domestic political situation in Spain. In the process he displays a knowledge of and interest in Spanish society which is striking. We do not know whether the author himself has intimate knowledge of Spanish politics or whether he is plagiarising good secondary sources. However, the very fact that he deems such a high level of detail necessary for his argument indicates that we are dealing with a politically very developed mind. It must also be noted that of the three case studies, the chapter on Spain is by far the best in terms of analytical clarity.
The most interesting passage of the whole text is the author’s concluding remarks regarding Spain:
"Aznar’s position does not express the Spanish popular stance, and if the disparity between the government and the people were at the same percentage rate in Britain, then the government would fall. But this has not happened thus far, for a number of reasons, including:
- That the Spanish people, despite the passing of more than quarter of a century of democracy, has not reached the level of e.g. Britain in terms of accountability of its rulers. So far it (the people) has accepted the lies of the politicians as the truth and it does not see a reason for holding them accountable. This is contrary to the British who try to hold Blair accountable for his lies in making a case for Britain’s entry in the war on Iraq.
- That most of the rightist electorate are very loyal to their party. Despite the fact that the vast majority of the Spanish opposed the war, in the last local elections the Popular party electorate voted for their party and remained loyal to it.
- The power of the group Opus Dei in the Popular Party..
- The lack of direct influence of the Iraq events on life in Spain...
- The weakness of the leftist opposition and the failure of mounting a political struggle.
Therefore we say that in order to force the Spanish government to withdraw from Iraq the resistance should deal painful blows to its forces. This should be accompanied by an information campaign clarifying the truth of the matter inside Iraq. It is necessary to make utmost use of the upcoming general election in Spain in March next year.
We think that the Spanish government could not tolerate more than two, maximum three blows, after which it will have to withdraw as a result of popular pressure. If its troops still remain in Iraq after these blows, then the victory of the Socialist Party is almost secured, and the withdrawal of the Spanish forces will be on its electoral programme.
Lastly, we are emphasise that a withdrawal of the Spanish or Italian forces from Iraq would put huge pressure on the British presence (in Iraq), a pressure that Toni Blair might not be able to withstand, and hence the domino tiles would fall quickly. Yet, the basic problem of making the first tile fall still remains."
(The passage is underlined and in bold types in the Arabic original)
Relationship with the Madrid events
The document’s significance derives first of all from the way in which it might be linked to the Madrid events. FFI’s researchers think it is likely that the perpetrators of the attacks knew this document in some way or other. There are three reasons for this.
First of all, the document highlights Spain as the politically most convenient target of the coalition countries present in Iraq, and it specifically mentions the Spanish elections as a good time to strike.
Second, the recommendation to strike Spanish forces does not exclude attacks on other types of Spanish targets in other parts of the world. The perpetrators may have adopted the overall strategy outlined in the document while altering the tactics somewhat and taking the campaign onto Spanish territory. After all, the author makes a point out of the fact that the Iraq war has so far not affected life in Spain ("..lack of direct influence of the Iraq events on life in Spain"). Moreover, the fact that the document is addressed to global jihadists, and that it was posted on the "Global Islamic Media" website indicates that its scope went way beyond the Iraqi battlefield.
Third, the man who assumes responsibility for the attacks appears on a video under the name Abu Dujana al-Afghani, echoing a reference to the historical Abu Dujana on page 2 of the document, which goes as follows: "Verily (the crusaders) do not and will not be turned away (from aggression against Islam) except by the youth who have sold their souls to God Almighty, and who have put on the headband of death ... the headband of Abu Dujana".
Abu Dujana was one of the companions of the Prophet Muhammad and known as a brave fighter. His trademark was a red headband known as the "headband of death" (‘asbat al-mawt), which he wound around his helmet before going into battle. For this reason "Abu Dujana" has sometimes been used as an alias by mujahidin in various parts of the world. In this case, however, we cannot exclude the possibility that the person on the videotape has chosen the alias Abu Dujana after reading this document. Alternatively, perhaps it is the author who deliberately hints at the Moroccan-Spanish cell by mentioning Abu Dujana.
One must always be very careful to link anonymous ideological texts with specific events on the ground, especially when the texts contain few operational details. One by one, the abovementioned the points of convergence are not enough to link the document to the attacks. However, when the indications are considered as a whole and coupled with details from the investigation such as the videotape, a very interesting picture emerges. This leads us to suggest that we are dealing with a text which served as ideological inspiration and policy guidance for the terrorist attacks in Madrid.
FFI
Well there it is. Talk about Clinton having something and not doing nothing about it, well? Do I have to spell it out here.
posted by madtom at 12:00 AM
1 Comments:
Apparently so
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