AP Blog: Watching the skies of Iraq

— AP Correspondent Rebecca Santana is embedded with the New Jersey National Guard at Camp Anaconda, Iraq. And AP Correspondent Robert H. Reid covers Iraq events from Baghdad for The Associated Press.

Aug. 1, 8:30 p.m. local

CAMP ANACONDA

When I need to file my stories or check e-mail, I take my computer and satellite phone out to a gravel field near the trailer where I'm staying. I sit down, set up my equipment and type away. As I was sitting there a few nights ago, I noticed helicopters coming in, pairs of Black Hawks flying low and slow, almost tracing the road that runs in front of the field where I was sitting. First two helicopters, one following the other, flew by. Then, maybe 20 minutes later, another pair flew by. I didn't think too much of it because if you look into the sky around Camp Anaconda, there's almost always a plane or helicopter flying overhead.

It wasn't until the next day that I found out what was going on. The Black Hawks were most likely taking patients to the Air Force hospital on base, where the most seriously injured American soldiers or Marines in Iraq are treated, usually before moving on to a hospital in Germany. The hospital also treats Iraqi military, police, civilians, even insurgents. Now, every time I now see those helicopters _ and you see them with frightening regularity _ I can't help thinking of whoever's inside, ripped open by shrapnel or pockmarked by bullets.

_ Rebecca Santana

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Friday, July 28, 2:17 p.m. local

CAMP ANACONDA

One of Command Sgt. Major Lawrence A. Halls biggest worries in Iraq is Gatorade. Too much Gatorade, to be precise. The problem started with making sure the troops were hydrated in the hot July sun, when the low temperature is still in the 90s and the high often goes well above 110. And in this case, hydrated doesnt mean seven to eight glasses of water a day as is recommended by many beauty magazines to keep your skin glowing. It means seven to eight liters of water a day. But liter after liter of water obviously doesnt have a lot of taste to it, so troops like to mix up what theyre drinking, and Gatorade is an obvious choice.

Then Hall, of the Army's 1st Squadron, 167th Cavalry, learned that the medical staff is starting to notice an increase in kidney stones and gall stones in troops. They believe its because the guys _ and gals _ are drinking a lot of Gatorade and at the same time, not getting enough exercise. So soldiers are encouraged to either exercise more or drink water instead of Gatorade. Theyre also rationing the amount of Gatorade troops can pick up at the dining facility to two bottles per person, whereas in the past, troops could _ and often did _ fill up every pocket with a bottle of the green or orange liquid.

Cutting back on the amount of Gatorade also means fewer convoys on the highways bringing the stuff in and, as a result, fewer people dying from roadside bomb attacks. Hall said he didnt know whether it was the medical reasons or the aim of limiting convoys that originally led to the 2-bottles per person rule, but the end result has been a Gatorade crackdown. "Who would have thought that wed come to Iraq and my biggest problem would be too much Gatorade?" said Hall. "Little things that you would think never matter, are a big deal around here."

_ Rebecca Santana

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Saturday, July 29, 9:30 a.m. local

BAGHDAD

Eight months ago, it all seemed quite different. The Iraqis were going to "stand up," and American troops were going "to stand down."

Sure, the Iraqis may not have the firepower nor all the fancy computer gadgetry of the high-tech American fighting force, U.S. officials said last year. And the potbellies all too familiar at Iraqi recruiting stations might not pass muster at Fort Benning.

But the Iraqis were going to bring something else to the equation that American and other international troops in Iraq never could.

"Bringing skills and knowledge to the fight that coalition forces cannot, Iraqi troops know their people, language, and culture," the White House said in a November 2005 fact sheet entitled Training Iraqi Security Forces.

"They know who the terrorists are and are earning the trust of their countrymen. As Iraqi forces grow in size and capability, they are helping to keep a better hold on cities and are increasingly taking the lead."

Things look different now _ after 6,000 Iraqis were killed in May and June alone, according to the United Nations.

"Undoubtedly the Iraqi people have lost confidence in the police," Britain's outgoing ambassador to Iraq, William Patey, told the British Broadcasting Corporation last Thursday.

On the same day, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld was lengthening the tours of about 3,500 members of the 172nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team for up to four more months as part of a plan to bolster U.S. troop strength to shore up Iraqi security forces that are in danger of losing this capital to the gunmen.

What's more, the Pentagon is signaling plans to maintain or possibly increase the number of American service members in Iraq. Not so long ago, word was that substantial troop cuts were in the works by the end of the year _ and in time for the midterm U.S. elections.

Now, it looks like even more Americans will be spending Christmas in Iraq _ and not with their families back home.

So what went wrong? Were the rosy predictions of last November pure illusion?

No, but those forecasts glossed over a lot of problems. And under political pressure to wind down in Iraq, the Bush administration wasn't anxious to advertise what its people on the ground here were privately telling them _ building a capable Iraqi force is going to take a long time.

Few Sunni Arabs have joined the security forces, which are heavy with Shiites and Kurds. They may all be Iraqis. But if they are from a different sect or ethnic group, Iraqi soldiers and police are not fully trusted by civilians. Having American troops with the Iraqi units is supposed to build confidence that the U.S. soldiers will make sure the Iraqis in uniform protect Shiites and Sunnis alike.

The Americans will also press the Iraqis to disband sectarian militias. That too won't be easy. The militias flourish because civilians trust the gunmen more than government forces to protect them from the rival sect. Until Iraqis trust the Iraqi army more than the militias, no amount of force or appeals from political leaders will undermine support for the gunmen.

It's by no means clear the new strategy will be more successful than the old. At best, success will take time, patience and support from the public _ not only in Iraq but in the United States as well.
Chron