.Baradar’s Capture
Besides the obvious LOL that Mullah Baradar was lying when he said the Taliban aren’t in Karachi, this is potentially huge news. We’ll Keep It Brief:
He is an Afghan Taliban figure captured in Sindh. That’s an unavoidable voiding of several Pakistani narratives about the nature and reach of the group.
It was a joint CIA-ISI operation, with the ISI taking the lead. “ISI sab ka dada hai,” as they say: the ISI is everyone’s granddaddy. We paid a price for this, keep an eye out for what it might be.
Baradar supposedly runs the Quetta Shura, which is largely responsible for insurgent activity in the South—including the areas surrounding Marjeh. What his capture means for the day-to-day and strategic activities of the Taliban is unclear, though it could be game-changing.
On the other hand, the Taliban has weathered the death of senior, effective, influential figures before, like the former Taliban “senior military commander” until his death-by-America in 2007. The Taliban, notably, regrouped and kept on fighting hard.
At least in the short term, this could be a great wedge for the U.S. to wield against local powers. In the long term, it might actually mean little because he’s really not that much of a wedge.
Normally, America’s increasing presence in Pakistan is elevated as a primary factor in that country’s destabilization. It is possible the ISI felt this high profile joint raid was worth the risk. It is also possible those destabilization fears are actually overblown. It is also possible the boys in ‘Pindi are incapable of long-term planning (see the bullet about costs, above).
Baradar wrote the Conduct Guidebook, which was meant to moderate some fo the Taliban’s more nastier excesses. Much like the assassination of Nek Mohammed is what gave us five years of Baitullah Mehsud, there is a chance that Baradar’s successor will be much worse. There is also the chance he’ll be weaker and less formidable.
There is a chance this is the opening stage of a gambit to force Mullah Omar to the negotiating table. The current Amnesty Law in Kabul, however, is already drawing fire for its gentle treatment of mass murderers.
We can continue along this vein for quite sometime, but here is the bottom line: this is a big deal. In the short run, it leaves a big hole right at the top of the Taliban; it might also not have any real long term affect on the war, since other senior, seemingly crucial figures have been killed off or captured without any real effect on the longer war.
However, I am cautiously optimistic. I truly wish all my grinding pessimism about Afghanistan—born from the West’s ossified policies, rather than anything inherent to Afghanistan itself—would come up empty, and we could start seeing more victories like this.
At the same time, President Obama and all his senior military leaders have been up front that America needed to “show some progress” during this year or all bets would be off. There is a very real chance the U.S. traded something we’d normally consider a big deal to get Baradar for his symbolic significance. If that’s the case, then this may not be the big deal it seems now.
But like I said: I’m choosing cautious optimism this will pay off in some way. Here’s hoping.
Registan.net
He is an Afghan Taliban figure captured in Sindh. That’s an unavoidable voiding of several Pakistani narratives about the nature and reach of the group.
It was a joint CIA-ISI operation, with the ISI taking the lead. “ISI sab ka dada hai,” as they say: the ISI is everyone’s granddaddy. We paid a price for this, keep an eye out for what it might be.
Baradar supposedly runs the Quetta Shura, which is largely responsible for insurgent activity in the South—including the areas surrounding Marjeh. What his capture means for the day-to-day and strategic activities of the Taliban is unclear, though it could be game-changing.
On the other hand, the Taliban has weathered the death of senior, effective, influential figures before, like the former Taliban “senior military commander” until his death-by-America in 2007. The Taliban, notably, regrouped and kept on fighting hard.
At least in the short term, this could be a great wedge for the U.S. to wield against local powers. In the long term, it might actually mean little because he’s really not that much of a wedge.
Normally, America’s increasing presence in Pakistan is elevated as a primary factor in that country’s destabilization. It is possible the ISI felt this high profile joint raid was worth the risk. It is also possible those destabilization fears are actually overblown. It is also possible the boys in ‘Pindi are incapable of long-term planning (see the bullet about costs, above).
Baradar wrote the Conduct Guidebook, which was meant to moderate some fo the Taliban’s more nastier excesses. Much like the assassination of Nek Mohammed is what gave us five years of Baitullah Mehsud, there is a chance that Baradar’s successor will be much worse. There is also the chance he’ll be weaker and less formidable.
There is a chance this is the opening stage of a gambit to force Mullah Omar to the negotiating table. The current Amnesty Law in Kabul, however, is already drawing fire for its gentle treatment of mass murderers.
We can continue along this vein for quite sometime, but here is the bottom line: this is a big deal. In the short run, it leaves a big hole right at the top of the Taliban; it might also not have any real long term affect on the war, since other senior, seemingly crucial figures have been killed off or captured without any real effect on the longer war.
However, I am cautiously optimistic. I truly wish all my grinding pessimism about Afghanistan—born from the West’s ossified policies, rather than anything inherent to Afghanistan itself—would come up empty, and we could start seeing more victories like this.
At the same time, President Obama and all his senior military leaders have been up front that America needed to “show some progress” during this year or all bets would be off. There is a very real chance the U.S. traded something we’d normally consider a big deal to get Baradar for his symbolic significance. If that’s the case, then this may not be the big deal it seems now.
But like I said: I’m choosing cautious optimism this will pay off in some way. Here’s hoping.
Registan.net
posted by madtom at 10:16 PM
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