.IG: Dead count toward Iraqi force strength
Some of the troops on the rolls of the Iraqi Security Forces aren’t reporting for duty.
That is because they’re dead.
And thousands of others counted as present for duty are not showing up for work because they’re injured, on leave or absent without leave, according to a new audit of the Pentagon’s most recent quarterly report on Iraq by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, a temporary federal agency created by Congress to provide oversight of U.S. dollars spent for Iraqi relief and rebuilding.
All told, the review of the March report and earlier quarterly reports on Iraq indicates, the IG said, “uncertainty about the number of Iraqi personnel who are present for duty at any one time [and] uncertainty about the capabilities of the police force because the police have greater capacity to recruit than to train.” The latter limits the number of police on the rolls who have been trained, the IG said.
“The number of assigned and trained personnel presented in the [quarterly] reports does not present a complete picture of force capabilities,” the IG said.
The Pentagon says the dead and wounded remain on the Iraqi rolls so their families can continue to be paid and receive medical care.
In defense of ISF progress, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, commenting on a draft version of the audit report, said that the ISF present-for-duty figure has increased. The command said that as of April 5, 70 percent of the roughly 160,000 troops assigned across the Iraqi Army were present for duty. The Jan. 1 total of all ISF personnel was 531,616, according to the Pentagon’s March report.
MNSTC-I also said that the number of trained personnel should not be interpreted as an indicator of force capability, saying that operational assessments such as those contained in the March report are the best indicator. The Iraqi army received the best marks; the National Police, the worst.
But Army Gen. David Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, touted a decidedly raw number in his April testimony before Congress, saying that Iraq added “well over 100,000” additional troops and police in 2007 and is “slowly increasing its capability to deploy and employ these forces.” He cited Iraq’s lack of full capability and the need to protect the past year’s security gains as the reason to slow the ongoing U.S. troop drawdown.
The Pentagon says that a synthesis of four separate studies indicates that the ISF should grow to between 601,000 and 646,000 — presumably trained and ready — by 2010 in order to adequately control internal threats. However, the forces would not, at that point, be able to protect Iraq from external threats, the IG said.
Iraqi security forces include Iraqi army troops, special operations forces, the Police Service, the National Police and the Border Police. Since 2003, Congress has appropriated $20.4 billion to support the ISF’s development, the IG said. The recently passed 2008 Iraqi budget provides roughly $9 billion for this purpose.
The IG audited Pentagon quarterly reports on Iraq, including the most recent, posted in March, as well as past such reports, required by Congress since 2005. The IG also reviewed its own prior reports and those of the Government Accountability Office, the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, and others.
The IG concluded that its audit “suggests a continuing need for caution in relying on the accuracy and usefulness of the [ISF] numbers.”
The IG said this is because:
• There are continuing uncertainties about the true number of assigned and trained Iraqi personnel who are present for duty at any one time. A substantial number of personnel still on the payroll are not available for duty for various reasons, such as being on leave, absent without leave, injured, or killed.
• Evolving changes in reporting methodology make it difficult to compare information from one report to earlier reports.
• The numbers of personnel reported as trained are not easily correlated with those assigned, the latter including persons not yet trained. Further, both assigned and trained numbers include persons no longer on duty, and the number of trained personnel, in and of itself, is widely recognized as an inadequate indicator of force capability
• The shortage of officers and noncommissioned officers in the Iraqi Security Forces remains a significant long-term shortfall that could take a decade to address.
• There is a recognized need for additional Iraqi security forces by 2010 to field a counterinsurgency force capable of protecting the country against internal threats and insurgency Iraqi forces still rely on substantial logistical support of coalition forces.
With a current focus is on addressing internal security needs, the longer-term focus on the force structure needed to counter external threats has yet to be addressed.
The Pentagon acknowledged in its March report the lack of precision in the numbers of assigned ISF personnel, saying in footnote to a chart, “It is unknown how many personnel trained in U.S.-funded programs remain on the force.” With regard to the “trained” ISF forces, the report went on to state, “Numbers reflect total Iraqi forces personnel trained to date, some of whom are no longer assigned due to casualties, absent without leave, etc.”
Then there are accounting errors. For instance, the number of Iraqi police trained — 155,248, as reported in March — is a reduction from the December 2007 report of 174,025. According to the March quarterly report, this was due to basic training graduates being inadvertently double-counted.
In an earlier quarterly report, the Pentagon said the actual number of present-for-duty soldiers is about one-half to two-thirds of those assigned. According to the two most recent quarterly reports, there is no data on how many of the Iraqi personnel who have been trained are still actively serving in the ISF, the IG said.
The disparity between total and trained ISF personnel has been previously noted. In a March 2007 report, the GAO said that high rates of absenteeism and poor ministry reporting resulted in an overstatement of ISF personnel present for duty.
The ISF numbers in the quarterly reports are “reportedly derived” from multiple sources within Iraqi ministries, the IG found. While the Pentagon “makes some efforts” to acknowledge the reliability of such data, its visibility will lessen as the Iraqi government assumes greater control over the training and assignment of its forces, the IG said.
The Pentagon says a new computerized system for management of ISF accountability and pay, the Human Resources Information Management System — along with improvements in Iraqi processes and bureaucracy — will be able to identify and remove “ghost soldiers” from the rolls. The system was supposed to be fielded in February, but the rollout date has been extended, the IG said.
ArmyTimes
That is because they’re dead.
And thousands of others counted as present for duty are not showing up for work because they’re injured, on leave or absent without leave, according to a new audit of the Pentagon’s most recent quarterly report on Iraq by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, a temporary federal agency created by Congress to provide oversight of U.S. dollars spent for Iraqi relief and rebuilding.
All told, the review of the March report and earlier quarterly reports on Iraq indicates, the IG said, “uncertainty about the number of Iraqi personnel who are present for duty at any one time [and] uncertainty about the capabilities of the police force because the police have greater capacity to recruit than to train.” The latter limits the number of police on the rolls who have been trained, the IG said.
“The number of assigned and trained personnel presented in the [quarterly] reports does not present a complete picture of force capabilities,” the IG said.
The Pentagon says the dead and wounded remain on the Iraqi rolls so their families can continue to be paid and receive medical care.
In defense of ISF progress, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, commenting on a draft version of the audit report, said that the ISF present-for-duty figure has increased. The command said that as of April 5, 70 percent of the roughly 160,000 troops assigned across the Iraqi Army were present for duty. The Jan. 1 total of all ISF personnel was 531,616, according to the Pentagon’s March report.
MNSTC-I also said that the number of trained personnel should not be interpreted as an indicator of force capability, saying that operational assessments such as those contained in the March report are the best indicator. The Iraqi army received the best marks; the National Police, the worst.
But Army Gen. David Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, touted a decidedly raw number in his April testimony before Congress, saying that Iraq added “well over 100,000” additional troops and police in 2007 and is “slowly increasing its capability to deploy and employ these forces.” He cited Iraq’s lack of full capability and the need to protect the past year’s security gains as the reason to slow the ongoing U.S. troop drawdown.
The Pentagon says that a synthesis of four separate studies indicates that the ISF should grow to between 601,000 and 646,000 — presumably trained and ready — by 2010 in order to adequately control internal threats. However, the forces would not, at that point, be able to protect Iraq from external threats, the IG said.
Iraqi security forces include Iraqi army troops, special operations forces, the Police Service, the National Police and the Border Police. Since 2003, Congress has appropriated $20.4 billion to support the ISF’s development, the IG said. The recently passed 2008 Iraqi budget provides roughly $9 billion for this purpose.
The IG audited Pentagon quarterly reports on Iraq, including the most recent, posted in March, as well as past such reports, required by Congress since 2005. The IG also reviewed its own prior reports and those of the Government Accountability Office, the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, and others.
The IG concluded that its audit “suggests a continuing need for caution in relying on the accuracy and usefulness of the [ISF] numbers.”
The IG said this is because:
• There are continuing uncertainties about the true number of assigned and trained Iraqi personnel who are present for duty at any one time. A substantial number of personnel still on the payroll are not available for duty for various reasons, such as being on leave, absent without leave, injured, or killed.
• Evolving changes in reporting methodology make it difficult to compare information from one report to earlier reports.
• The numbers of personnel reported as trained are not easily correlated with those assigned, the latter including persons not yet trained. Further, both assigned and trained numbers include persons no longer on duty, and the number of trained personnel, in and of itself, is widely recognized as an inadequate indicator of force capability
• The shortage of officers and noncommissioned officers in the Iraqi Security Forces remains a significant long-term shortfall that could take a decade to address.
• There is a recognized need for additional Iraqi security forces by 2010 to field a counterinsurgency force capable of protecting the country against internal threats and insurgency Iraqi forces still rely on substantial logistical support of coalition forces.
With a current focus is on addressing internal security needs, the longer-term focus on the force structure needed to counter external threats has yet to be addressed.
The Pentagon acknowledged in its March report the lack of precision in the numbers of assigned ISF personnel, saying in footnote to a chart, “It is unknown how many personnel trained in U.S.-funded programs remain on the force.” With regard to the “trained” ISF forces, the report went on to state, “Numbers reflect total Iraqi forces personnel trained to date, some of whom are no longer assigned due to casualties, absent without leave, etc.”
Then there are accounting errors. For instance, the number of Iraqi police trained — 155,248, as reported in March — is a reduction from the December 2007 report of 174,025. According to the March quarterly report, this was due to basic training graduates being inadvertently double-counted.
In an earlier quarterly report, the Pentagon said the actual number of present-for-duty soldiers is about one-half to two-thirds of those assigned. According to the two most recent quarterly reports, there is no data on how many of the Iraqi personnel who have been trained are still actively serving in the ISF, the IG said.
The disparity between total and trained ISF personnel has been previously noted. In a March 2007 report, the GAO said that high rates of absenteeism and poor ministry reporting resulted in an overstatement of ISF personnel present for duty.
The ISF numbers in the quarterly reports are “reportedly derived” from multiple sources within Iraqi ministries, the IG found. While the Pentagon “makes some efforts” to acknowledge the reliability of such data, its visibility will lessen as the Iraqi government assumes greater control over the training and assignment of its forces, the IG said.
The Pentagon says a new computerized system for management of ISF accountability and pay, the Human Resources Information Management System — along with improvements in Iraqi processes and bureaucracy — will be able to identify and remove “ghost soldiers” from the rolls. The system was supposed to be fielded in February, but the rollout date has been extended, the IG said.
ArmyTimes
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