.Iraq: Nationalists vs. Jihadists and the Sunni Split
Summary
Sunni nationalist guerrillas and jihadists battled with each other in the Iraqi capital May 31, marking a significant shift in the focus of al Qaeda and its allies, which have thus far mostly struck Shiite targets. The struggle over the leadership of the Sunni insurgency is reaching a critical phase due to the multilevel political dealings aimed at reaching a power-sharing settlement in Iraq. The jihadists are trying to exploit internal differences among the Sunnis, but they probably will not succeed since their actions likely will end up unifying the various Sunni groups against al Qaeda and its allies.
Analysis
Militants from the main Sunni nationalist insurgent group, the Islamic Army in Iraq, and the al Qaeda jihadist alliance known as the Islamic State of Iraq fought fierce battles May 31 for control of the southwestern Baghdad district Al Amiriyah provoked by jihadists' efforts to assert themselves in the area. On the same day, a jihadist suicide bomber struck a police recruitment center in the Sunni-majority town of Al Fallujah, killing 30 people and wounding scores. And on May 28, a truck bomb partially destroyed a mosque that houses the shrine of a major 12th century Sunni religious figure, Abdul Qadir al-Gailani.
These three events represent a shift in the operational behavior of jihadists, who thus far mostly have concentrated their attacks on Shiite targets. The sectarian conflict in Iraq has taken a new turn in which jihadists now are hitting mainstream Sunnis. The shift indicates the struggle over the leadership of the insurgency is intensifying, especially since mainstream Sunni forces are gearing up for the power-sharing settlement that will follow the now-public U.S.-Iranian negotiations.
Al Qaeda and its allies realize their situation is becoming increasingly untenable because the movement toward a political settlement in Iraq will translate into their annihilation. We are already seeing how tribal forces in Anbar, Diyala and Babil have begun to cleanse their areas of jihadist elements. Additionally, tribal leaders in Anbar have held meetings with the al-Sadrite movement.
There also has been a realignment of the forces that span the Sunni insurgent spectrum, with the transnational al Qaeda trying to ally itself with Iraqi militants and tribes sharing its viewpoint. Meanwhile, Sunni nationalist elements such as the Islamic Army of Iraq have formed coalitions to counter the jihadists. While tribal forces have been fighting the jihadists for close to a year now, today's clash is the first between a Sunni insurgent group and the al Qaeda-led coalition. It should be noted that the ranks of Sunni nationalist groups like the Islamic Army of Iraq are filled with Baathists-turned-Islamists who belonged to the security forces during the Saddam Hussein era.
Such elements want to be included in a negotiated settlement, but they face opposition from Iran and its Iraqi allies. The Shia, who are otherwise the most divided communal group in the country, are in fact in agreement over opposition to the Baathists, whom they accuse of collaborating with the jihadists. The former Baathists must therefore demonstrate they are not aligned with the jihadists, which provides another explanation for the Sunni nationalist clash with the jihadists.
The Sunni nationalist insurgents also face competition on the issue of opposing the jihadists from several Sunni tribes, which have formed militias to fight al Qaeda and its allies in an effort to get a seat at the Kurdish, Sunni and Shiite negotiating table. Fighting among Sunnis extends beyond militant factions to a host of different Sunni groups.
In addition to the insurgent groups and the tribes with their own militias, Iraq's fractured Sunnis also include political groups such as the three-party Islamist-leaning Tawafoq Iraqi Front, with 44 seats in parliament, and the Hewar National Iraqi Front, a secular-leaning coalition of five parties that controls 11 seats in the national legislature. There is also the Sunni religious establishment, with its most notable group being the Association of Muslim Scholars led by the hard-line Sheikh Harith al-Dhari.
The sundry components that comprise the Iraqi Sunni landscape are at odds with one another over the proposed size of the Sunni share of power in a future Iraq. Given that they are part of the system already, the political groups are perhaps the most accommodating. But they face challenges from the tribes, which feel their interests have not been represented by the political groups in parliament -- thus prompting their attempt to emerge as the vanguard of the struggle against the jihadists.
This not only pits the tribes asserting themselves by fighting al Qaeda against the political groups, but it also pits them against the Sunni nationalist insurgent organizations. The nationalist organizations in turn feel the tribes are invading their turf, another reasons for today's clash in Baghdad. Another problem the Sunni insurgent groups face is their need to balance entering the political mainstream with their demand for a U.S. withdrawal. The religious establishment, which not only has maintained a tough anti-U.S. line but also has become increasingly anti-Iranian in recent months, is pushing the insurgents in this direction.
Opposition to growing Iranian influence in Iraq is one thing all Sunni factions agree upon. This anti-Shiite impulse within the Iraqi Sunni community, along with the increasing factionalism among Sunnis, provides al Qaeda and its jihadist allies the opportunity to sustain and enhance their own position by exploiting the anti-Shiite and anti-U.S. sentiment to drive a wedge between pragmatic Sunnis and more ideological Sunnis.
From the jihadist point of view, Sunnis willing to accept minority status within a Shiite- (and, by extension, an Iranian-) dominated Iraq and to work with Washington are doing so because they are not true Muslims. The extremist Wahhabism of the jihadists allows them to justify targeting the Sunni shrine, which they loathe as a symbol of what they deem deviant Sufi practices.
That said, the jihadists did not employ their signature tactic of using suicide bombers to strike the shrine. Using a truck bomb allows the jihadists to prevent any potential backlash from the Sunni community, which the jihadists do not want to alienate totally. The bombing also helps fuel the Shiite/Sunni sectarian fire by raising suspicions that Shiite militants potentially bombed the al-Gailani shrine in retaliation for the attacks on Shiite sacred sites.
The U.S.-Iranian negotiations on Iraq have created a political dynamic not only among Iraq's three main communities but also between them, especially among the Sunnis and the Shia, both of whom are rushing for an internal consensus. The developments within the Sunni community are key in that they have resulted in a new type of sectarian war that pits Wahhabi Sunnis against mainstream ones. This emerging scenario has the potential to spoil any final settlement.
Stratfor
Sunni nationalist guerrillas and jihadists battled with each other in the Iraqi capital May 31, marking a significant shift in the focus of al Qaeda and its allies, which have thus far mostly struck Shiite targets. The struggle over the leadership of the Sunni insurgency is reaching a critical phase due to the multilevel political dealings aimed at reaching a power-sharing settlement in Iraq. The jihadists are trying to exploit internal differences among the Sunnis, but they probably will not succeed since their actions likely will end up unifying the various Sunni groups against al Qaeda and its allies.
Analysis
Militants from the main Sunni nationalist insurgent group, the Islamic Army in Iraq, and the al Qaeda jihadist alliance known as the Islamic State of Iraq fought fierce battles May 31 for control of the southwestern Baghdad district Al Amiriyah provoked by jihadists' efforts to assert themselves in the area. On the same day, a jihadist suicide bomber struck a police recruitment center in the Sunni-majority town of Al Fallujah, killing 30 people and wounding scores. And on May 28, a truck bomb partially destroyed a mosque that houses the shrine of a major 12th century Sunni religious figure, Abdul Qadir al-Gailani.
These three events represent a shift in the operational behavior of jihadists, who thus far mostly have concentrated their attacks on Shiite targets. The sectarian conflict in Iraq has taken a new turn in which jihadists now are hitting mainstream Sunnis. The shift indicates the struggle over the leadership of the insurgency is intensifying, especially since mainstream Sunni forces are gearing up for the power-sharing settlement that will follow the now-public U.S.-Iranian negotiations.
Al Qaeda and its allies realize their situation is becoming increasingly untenable because the movement toward a political settlement in Iraq will translate into their annihilation. We are already seeing how tribal forces in Anbar, Diyala and Babil have begun to cleanse their areas of jihadist elements. Additionally, tribal leaders in Anbar have held meetings with the al-Sadrite movement.
There also has been a realignment of the forces that span the Sunni insurgent spectrum, with the transnational al Qaeda trying to ally itself with Iraqi militants and tribes sharing its viewpoint. Meanwhile, Sunni nationalist elements such as the Islamic Army of Iraq have formed coalitions to counter the jihadists. While tribal forces have been fighting the jihadists for close to a year now, today's clash is the first between a Sunni insurgent group and the al Qaeda-led coalition. It should be noted that the ranks of Sunni nationalist groups like the Islamic Army of Iraq are filled with Baathists-turned-Islamists who belonged to the security forces during the Saddam Hussein era.
Such elements want to be included in a negotiated settlement, but they face opposition from Iran and its Iraqi allies. The Shia, who are otherwise the most divided communal group in the country, are in fact in agreement over opposition to the Baathists, whom they accuse of collaborating with the jihadists. The former Baathists must therefore demonstrate they are not aligned with the jihadists, which provides another explanation for the Sunni nationalist clash with the jihadists.
The Sunni nationalist insurgents also face competition on the issue of opposing the jihadists from several Sunni tribes, which have formed militias to fight al Qaeda and its allies in an effort to get a seat at the Kurdish, Sunni and Shiite negotiating table. Fighting among Sunnis extends beyond militant factions to a host of different Sunni groups.
In addition to the insurgent groups and the tribes with their own militias, Iraq's fractured Sunnis also include political groups such as the three-party Islamist-leaning Tawafoq Iraqi Front, with 44 seats in parliament, and the Hewar National Iraqi Front, a secular-leaning coalition of five parties that controls 11 seats in the national legislature. There is also the Sunni religious establishment, with its most notable group being the Association of Muslim Scholars led by the hard-line Sheikh Harith al-Dhari.
The sundry components that comprise the Iraqi Sunni landscape are at odds with one another over the proposed size of the Sunni share of power in a future Iraq. Given that they are part of the system already, the political groups are perhaps the most accommodating. But they face challenges from the tribes, which feel their interests have not been represented by the political groups in parliament -- thus prompting their attempt to emerge as the vanguard of the struggle against the jihadists.
This not only pits the tribes asserting themselves by fighting al Qaeda against the political groups, but it also pits them against the Sunni nationalist insurgent organizations. The nationalist organizations in turn feel the tribes are invading their turf, another reasons for today's clash in Baghdad. Another problem the Sunni insurgent groups face is their need to balance entering the political mainstream with their demand for a U.S. withdrawal. The religious establishment, which not only has maintained a tough anti-U.S. line but also has become increasingly anti-Iranian in recent months, is pushing the insurgents in this direction.
Opposition to growing Iranian influence in Iraq is one thing all Sunni factions agree upon. This anti-Shiite impulse within the Iraqi Sunni community, along with the increasing factionalism among Sunnis, provides al Qaeda and its jihadist allies the opportunity to sustain and enhance their own position by exploiting the anti-Shiite and anti-U.S. sentiment to drive a wedge between pragmatic Sunnis and more ideological Sunnis.
From the jihadist point of view, Sunnis willing to accept minority status within a Shiite- (and, by extension, an Iranian-) dominated Iraq and to work with Washington are doing so because they are not true Muslims. The extremist Wahhabism of the jihadists allows them to justify targeting the Sunni shrine, which they loathe as a symbol of what they deem deviant Sufi practices.
That said, the jihadists did not employ their signature tactic of using suicide bombers to strike the shrine. Using a truck bomb allows the jihadists to prevent any potential backlash from the Sunni community, which the jihadists do not want to alienate totally. The bombing also helps fuel the Shiite/Sunni sectarian fire by raising suspicions that Shiite militants potentially bombed the al-Gailani shrine in retaliation for the attacks on Shiite sacred sites.
The U.S.-Iranian negotiations on Iraq have created a political dynamic not only among Iraq's three main communities but also between them, especially among the Sunnis and the Shia, both of whom are rushing for an internal consensus. The developments within the Sunni community are key in that they have resulted in a new type of sectarian war that pits Wahhabi Sunnis against mainstream ones. This emerging scenario has the potential to spoil any final settlement.
Stratfor
posted by madtom at 6:13 PM
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
<< Home