.General David Richards: Afghan campaign was woeful
Gen Sir David Richards, the Chief of the Defence Staff, is also highly critical of Nato’s command structure in Afghanistan, describing it in a new book as “disorganised and unhelpful”.
His remarks highlight the infighting and political turmoil that surrounded Britain’s military deployment to Afghanistan in the summer of 2006. Whitehall was caught off guard by the seriousness of the situation in Helmand province, where British troops were deployed in Nato’s reconstruction programme.
Most Labour ministers supported the view of John Reid, the defence secretary at the time, that “we would be perfectly happy to leave in three years’ time without firing one shot because our mission is to protect the reconstruction”.
Intelligence assessments conducted in southern Afghanistan concluded that they would receive a hostile reception.
“It was the equivalent of moving another gang into the East End of London,” one officer reported to London. “They [the Taliban] weren’t going to like it.” A detailed account of the military and political infighting during the deployment is in a new book by Sandy Gall, the ITN presenter who also runs a charity to provide Afghan victims of roadside bombs with artificial limbs.
In Gall’s book, War Against the Taliban, Sir David says that the British military establishment was ill-prepared for the deployment of forces, despite its leading role in the overthrow of the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein three years previously.
He criticises the Ministry of Defence for not providing “sufficient troops to dominate the physical and human terrain” and the failure of the Foreign Office and the Department for International Development to provide adequate resources for reconstruction. He also describes attempts by London and Washington to get the Taliban to engage in political reconciliation as “woeful”. Sir David also criticises the military establishment for being ill-prepared and with a “rather amateurish approach to high-level military operations verging on the complacent.” He also tempers his remarks by arguing that the war in Afghanistan can still be won and expresses his “clear faith” that “the British Armed Forces are now handsomely proving that they have the ability to reform and adapt”.
In 2006, Sir David had a major row with Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, the then head of the Armed Forces, over the failure of British officers to co-operate fully with Nato’s command structure.
“I am not prepared to accept these command and control arrangements,” Sir David bluntly informed Sir Jock. “I am not having anything to do with it.” The dispute was resolved only when Sir Jock complied with his demands.
Sir David accuses the Government of not understanding “the practicalities of high command” by refusing to provide him with a helicopter, meaning he was unable to visit the troops under his command.
Sir David also recounts a heated argument between Brigadier Ed Butler, the first British commander in Helmand, and an US general who took exception to him. “I nearly punched that damn Limey’s [Butler’s] lights out, he was so arrogant,” the US general said.
Telegraph
His remarks highlight the infighting and political turmoil that surrounded Britain’s military deployment to Afghanistan in the summer of 2006. Whitehall was caught off guard by the seriousness of the situation in Helmand province, where British troops were deployed in Nato’s reconstruction programme.
Most Labour ministers supported the view of John Reid, the defence secretary at the time, that “we would be perfectly happy to leave in three years’ time without firing one shot because our mission is to protect the reconstruction”.
Intelligence assessments conducted in southern Afghanistan concluded that they would receive a hostile reception.
“It was the equivalent of moving another gang into the East End of London,” one officer reported to London. “They [the Taliban] weren’t going to like it.” A detailed account of the military and political infighting during the deployment is in a new book by Sandy Gall, the ITN presenter who also runs a charity to provide Afghan victims of roadside bombs with artificial limbs.
In Gall’s book, War Against the Taliban, Sir David says that the British military establishment was ill-prepared for the deployment of forces, despite its leading role in the overthrow of the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein three years previously.
He criticises the Ministry of Defence for not providing “sufficient troops to dominate the physical and human terrain” and the failure of the Foreign Office and the Department for International Development to provide adequate resources for reconstruction. He also describes attempts by London and Washington to get the Taliban to engage in political reconciliation as “woeful”. Sir David also criticises the military establishment for being ill-prepared and with a “rather amateurish approach to high-level military operations verging on the complacent.” He also tempers his remarks by arguing that the war in Afghanistan can still be won and expresses his “clear faith” that “the British Armed Forces are now handsomely proving that they have the ability to reform and adapt”.
In 2006, Sir David had a major row with Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, the then head of the Armed Forces, over the failure of British officers to co-operate fully with Nato’s command structure.
“I am not prepared to accept these command and control arrangements,” Sir David bluntly informed Sir Jock. “I am not having anything to do with it.” The dispute was resolved only when Sir Jock complied with his demands.
Sir David accuses the Government of not understanding “the practicalities of high command” by refusing to provide him with a helicopter, meaning he was unable to visit the troops under his command.
Sir David also recounts a heated argument between Brigadier Ed Butler, the first British commander in Helmand, and an US general who took exception to him. “I nearly punched that damn Limey’s [Butler’s] lights out, he was so arrogant,” the US general said.
Telegraph
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