.The Secret War In Iraq
I see that Ahmad Chalabi, my frequent host in past visits to Baghdad, stands accused of colluding with Iran again. General Odierno, the commander of U.S. troops in Iraq, recently said Dr.Chalabi and his colleague Faisal Al Lami were "clearly influenced by Iran." The general said that Al Lami "has been involved in very nefarious activities in Iraq for some time. It is disappointing that someone like him is put in charge of the de-Baathification commission."
I know nothing of Mr. Al Lami and have never met him, but apparently he works closely with Ahmad Chalabi. General Odierno accused both of being in close contact with the leader of Iran's paramilitary brigades, the Quds forces, who train and supply hostile Shiite militias in Iraq.
To give the reader context, the issue here concerns Shiite politicians working via government committees to exclude Sunni candidates from running in the upcoming Iraqi elections. The process looks suspiciously like the one oft used by Iranian mullahs to vet out "moderates" before their own elections. I would bet, though, that most of the Sunni names blocked by Chalabi's committee have no kinship to moderates. Two weeks ago I wrote in a column here that it was easy to see why Ahmad Chalabi and other Shiites oppose the candidacy of anyone formerly associated with Saddam--that it was a matter of life and death as former Baathists are constantly trying to kill their rivals in government.
Nevertheless, you cannot have a serious election with the Sunnis not represented. Nor is there any excuse for colluding with Iran to destabilize Iraq, if that is indeed what Dr. Chalabi did. His Washington adviser, Francis Brooke, was quoted in the Washington Times as saying that "General Odierno showed a profound lack of understanding of Iraqi politics." Mr. Brooke went on to say that "every senior Iraqi politician, particularly the Kurdish and Shi'ite parties, has diplomatic relations with Iran, and concerning Ali Faisal al-Lami, General Odierno acknowledges that he had no evidence to demonstrate this charge."
Let me lay before the reader all the context I can and see where it leads us. For though I am loath to think ill of a friend--especially Dr.Chalabi, with whom I've lived through a fierce Al Quaeda mortar attack--I cannot say I'm sure of my position on this. In the first place, the U.S. military has hardly proved infallible in these matters: Remember the July 2003 hooding and arresting of 11 officially resident Turkish military personnel in northern (Kurdish) Iraq under suspicion that they were plotting to assassinate Kurdish politicians? They were later released without charge but not before the incident caused massive anti-U.S. feeling in Turkey, a Nato ally. Intelligence sources in Iraq can be highly tendentious not to say malicious, and often the U.S. military acts hastily because it has to.
Having said that, I have now heard from top UN and other officials connected to Iraq that Dr.Chalabi has drifted to the dark side. This is not a matter of hasty gossip-mongering--I have heard it over some years. Their information, though, seems to come always from the U.S. military. How did a staunch friend of the U.S. down the years suddenly become a public U.S. enemy in Iraq? The reader will remember that the Shiite patrician Dr.Chalabi is reviled by the American left for being a kind of Bush-whisperer, one who led the U.S. into the war with false information. Soon after the war's advent, though, the U.S. turned on him and accused him of spying for the Iranians. So he is now reviled by the American right too.
Dr.Chalabi denies he led the U.S. into anything. During one of my visits to Baghdad he told me that he passed on defectors and intelligence when he could, and it was up to the U.S. to decide. Sure, he had a personal beef against Saddam who had pursued him for years. He certainly wanted Saddam toppled, but he felt no pro-Iranian or anti-U.S. sentiment. He had studied at MIT after all. It does seem odd that one person can be credited with luring American policymakers in such a momentous direction. I never believe such things.
The U.S. does what it wants--and indeed did. After the invasion the U.S. unilaterally declared an occupation. According to Dr.Chalabi that contravened everything he and others had been promised. Iraqis were supposed to run an interim regime until elections could be held. He told me of a phone call from Douglas Feith where he said "Congratulations, we've declared an occupation." It astonished him. "Why an occupation? By what legal right? It immediately made America the enemy, the occupier. It made us collaborators. Originally, we were going to keep the Iraqi army in its barracks. We wanted to train an armed police force of patriots to keep order. We weren't allowed that. What happened? The army disbanded. There was no order. Chaos followed. Looting. Violence. The liberation became a foreign occupation, blamed for all the disasters."
Once the occupation became a fact, the Bush White House decided to sideline the disillusioned, not to say recalcitrant, Dr.Chalabi and his party for a preferred candidate: Nouri Al Maliki, the current Premier. The FBI got involved, raiding the Chalabi party offices, investigating Francis Brooke, and apparently finding nothing. As the insurgency grew into a Sunni-Shiite battle for Baghdad, no doubt Dr.Chalabi drew certain conclusions. The Shiites, being massively greater in number, soon won the battle for Baghdad and large numbers of Sunnis left. In response it appeared that the U.S. military tried to strike a balance--they certainly didn't want a Shiite arc stretching from Baghdad to Iran. They didn't want stability at the cost of strategically empowering Iran in the region.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
So the city of Baghdad began to experience a kind of choking siege. Bridges that linked Baghdad and the northern roads to Iran were blown by insurgents and never replaced. That left only access to southern Sunni countries, so Baghdad would be dependent on trade with them. Baathists invaded electricity stations supplying Baghdad and nothing was done to clear them. The city sank into darkness. No hot water, often no water. You couldn't find gasoline to power trucks and cars. To Dr.Chalabi it must have looked pretty clear: the U.S. playing Sunnis and Shiites against each other in order to dominate and rule. From the U.S. standpoint, having declared an occupation, it had to act as a fair arbiter between all sides. And no doubt there was plenty of pressure from the Saudis and other Sunnis to keep Iranian hegemony at bay.
Now to a cynic this may look like a classic imperial strategy, one that extends handily across Iraq's borders to the entire region. Allow a little Shiite leverage in Iraq and the Saudis will cooperate even with Israel to stop Iran. Give the Sunnis some power and the pressure falls onto Iran. To a different kind of cynic, of course, the whole enterprise was an ill-conceived mess and we're trying to make the best of it before we get out pronto. Dr.Chalabi has some cause to feel cynical, feeling sorely betrayed by his American allies as he does. Perhaps he thinks it was all planned, all done in bad faith. I don't know. But he should know this much: the path to safety and stability, however rocky, does not lie through Iran, however dangerous the threat from resurgent Baathists.
There's no doubt that any Iraqi politician worth his salt needs to talk to Tehran just to stay alive, if for nothing else. Kurdish politicians visit Iran for talks constantly, as do virtually all Shiite leaders. But to make common cause with Iran seems utterly shortsighted. In the first place, the Mullah regime itself looks headed for collapse. It surely cannot finance foreign adventures much longer with any authority as harder sanctions begin to bite. And if you grow to depend on the Tehran mafia's support, how do you shake it off? As the English saying goes, "Once you pay the Danegeld, you never get rid of the Dane." The adage refers to a time when England tried to buy off Viking invaders and instead incited them to invade the more. Any short-term protection you get from their kind will soon turn into intimidation. When the Basij militias in Iran finish with decimating their own population, they will not devote themselves to upholding Iraq's democratic processes.
If Dr.Chalabi and his colleagues dream of a truly liberated Iraq, their best chance is to make contacts with Iranian opposition figures to hasten the end of despotism in the region. They can all be sure of one thing: There will be no American occupation this time around. There wasn't the last time. Result? The Ayatollah Khomeini.
Forbes
I know nothing of Mr. Al Lami and have never met him, but apparently he works closely with Ahmad Chalabi. General Odierno accused both of being in close contact with the leader of Iran's paramilitary brigades, the Quds forces, who train and supply hostile Shiite militias in Iraq.
To give the reader context, the issue here concerns Shiite politicians working via government committees to exclude Sunni candidates from running in the upcoming Iraqi elections. The process looks suspiciously like the one oft used by Iranian mullahs to vet out "moderates" before their own elections. I would bet, though, that most of the Sunni names blocked by Chalabi's committee have no kinship to moderates. Two weeks ago I wrote in a column here that it was easy to see why Ahmad Chalabi and other Shiites oppose the candidacy of anyone formerly associated with Saddam--that it was a matter of life and death as former Baathists are constantly trying to kill their rivals in government.
Nevertheless, you cannot have a serious election with the Sunnis not represented. Nor is there any excuse for colluding with Iran to destabilize Iraq, if that is indeed what Dr. Chalabi did. His Washington adviser, Francis Brooke, was quoted in the Washington Times as saying that "General Odierno showed a profound lack of understanding of Iraqi politics." Mr. Brooke went on to say that "every senior Iraqi politician, particularly the Kurdish and Shi'ite parties, has diplomatic relations with Iran, and concerning Ali Faisal al-Lami, General Odierno acknowledges that he had no evidence to demonstrate this charge."
Let me lay before the reader all the context I can and see where it leads us. For though I am loath to think ill of a friend--especially Dr.Chalabi, with whom I've lived through a fierce Al Quaeda mortar attack--I cannot say I'm sure of my position on this. In the first place, the U.S. military has hardly proved infallible in these matters: Remember the July 2003 hooding and arresting of 11 officially resident Turkish military personnel in northern (Kurdish) Iraq under suspicion that they were plotting to assassinate Kurdish politicians? They were later released without charge but not before the incident caused massive anti-U.S. feeling in Turkey, a Nato ally. Intelligence sources in Iraq can be highly tendentious not to say malicious, and often the U.S. military acts hastily because it has to.
Having said that, I have now heard from top UN and other officials connected to Iraq that Dr.Chalabi has drifted to the dark side. This is not a matter of hasty gossip-mongering--I have heard it over some years. Their information, though, seems to come always from the U.S. military. How did a staunch friend of the U.S. down the years suddenly become a public U.S. enemy in Iraq? The reader will remember that the Shiite patrician Dr.Chalabi is reviled by the American left for being a kind of Bush-whisperer, one who led the U.S. into the war with false information. Soon after the war's advent, though, the U.S. turned on him and accused him of spying for the Iranians. So he is now reviled by the American right too.
Dr.Chalabi denies he led the U.S. into anything. During one of my visits to Baghdad he told me that he passed on defectors and intelligence when he could, and it was up to the U.S. to decide. Sure, he had a personal beef against Saddam who had pursued him for years. He certainly wanted Saddam toppled, but he felt no pro-Iranian or anti-U.S. sentiment. He had studied at MIT after all. It does seem odd that one person can be credited with luring American policymakers in such a momentous direction. I never believe such things.
The U.S. does what it wants--and indeed did. After the invasion the U.S. unilaterally declared an occupation. According to Dr.Chalabi that contravened everything he and others had been promised. Iraqis were supposed to run an interim regime until elections could be held. He told me of a phone call from Douglas Feith where he said "Congratulations, we've declared an occupation." It astonished him. "Why an occupation? By what legal right? It immediately made America the enemy, the occupier. It made us collaborators. Originally, we were going to keep the Iraqi army in its barracks. We wanted to train an armed police force of patriots to keep order. We weren't allowed that. What happened? The army disbanded. There was no order. Chaos followed. Looting. Violence. The liberation became a foreign occupation, blamed for all the disasters."
Once the occupation became a fact, the Bush White House decided to sideline the disillusioned, not to say recalcitrant, Dr.Chalabi and his party for a preferred candidate: Nouri Al Maliki, the current Premier. The FBI got involved, raiding the Chalabi party offices, investigating Francis Brooke, and apparently finding nothing. As the insurgency grew into a Sunni-Shiite battle for Baghdad, no doubt Dr.Chalabi drew certain conclusions. The Shiites, being massively greater in number, soon won the battle for Baghdad and large numbers of Sunnis left. In response it appeared that the U.S. military tried to strike a balance--they certainly didn't want a Shiite arc stretching from Baghdad to Iran. They didn't want stability at the cost of strategically empowering Iran in the region.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
So the city of Baghdad began to experience a kind of choking siege. Bridges that linked Baghdad and the northern roads to Iran were blown by insurgents and never replaced. That left only access to southern Sunni countries, so Baghdad would be dependent on trade with them. Baathists invaded electricity stations supplying Baghdad and nothing was done to clear them. The city sank into darkness. No hot water, often no water. You couldn't find gasoline to power trucks and cars. To Dr.Chalabi it must have looked pretty clear: the U.S. playing Sunnis and Shiites against each other in order to dominate and rule. From the U.S. standpoint, having declared an occupation, it had to act as a fair arbiter between all sides. And no doubt there was plenty of pressure from the Saudis and other Sunnis to keep Iranian hegemony at bay.
Now to a cynic this may look like a classic imperial strategy, one that extends handily across Iraq's borders to the entire region. Allow a little Shiite leverage in Iraq and the Saudis will cooperate even with Israel to stop Iran. Give the Sunnis some power and the pressure falls onto Iran. To a different kind of cynic, of course, the whole enterprise was an ill-conceived mess and we're trying to make the best of it before we get out pronto. Dr.Chalabi has some cause to feel cynical, feeling sorely betrayed by his American allies as he does. Perhaps he thinks it was all planned, all done in bad faith. I don't know. But he should know this much: the path to safety and stability, however rocky, does not lie through Iran, however dangerous the threat from resurgent Baathists.
There's no doubt that any Iraqi politician worth his salt needs to talk to Tehran just to stay alive, if for nothing else. Kurdish politicians visit Iran for talks constantly, as do virtually all Shiite leaders. But to make common cause with Iran seems utterly shortsighted. In the first place, the Mullah regime itself looks headed for collapse. It surely cannot finance foreign adventures much longer with any authority as harder sanctions begin to bite. And if you grow to depend on the Tehran mafia's support, how do you shake it off? As the English saying goes, "Once you pay the Danegeld, you never get rid of the Dane." The adage refers to a time when England tried to buy off Viking invaders and instead incited them to invade the more. Any short-term protection you get from their kind will soon turn into intimidation. When the Basij militias in Iran finish with decimating their own population, they will not devote themselves to upholding Iraq's democratic processes.
If Dr.Chalabi and his colleagues dream of a truly liberated Iraq, their best chance is to make contacts with Iranian opposition figures to hasten the end of despotism in the region. They can all be sure of one thing: There will be no American occupation this time around. There wasn't the last time. Result? The Ayatollah Khomeini.
Forbes
posted by madtom at 10:26 PM
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