.A Look at America’s New Hope: The Afghan Tribes
For three decades now, Communism, civil war and Islamic fundamentalism have laid siege to Afghanistan’s tribes. In many ways, Afghanistan’s tribal structure is arguably the weakest it has been in the country’s history.
Nonetheless, American civilian and military leaders are turning to some of these tribes as potentially their best hope for success against the resurgent Taliban after being frustrated by the weak central leadership of President Hamid Karzai.
Tribes have existed for millennia in the area that is present-day Afghanistan. They emerged over centuries in various sections of the country, taking form along extended kinship lines. Led by councils of elders, tribes provided their members with protection, financial support, a means to resolve disputes, and punishment of those who had committed crimes or broken tribal codes of conduct.
For Pashtuns, the country’s largest ethnic group and the Taliban’s primary source of support, tribes are particularly important. Successfully turning Pashtun tribes against the Taliban — or perhaps families or sub-tribes if they deal with the government on their own — could deliver a serious blow to the insurgency and potentially create a means of stabilizing the long-suffering country.
Some Afghans, though, warn that the tribal system is not a panacea and fear that the United States is adopting a quick-fix approach that will not create long-term stability. They see the tribes as inherently anachronistic, sexist and corrupt — a system that further undermines the already extraordinarily difficult task of creating multiethnic, merit-based national institutions. They warn that the country would be thrown into the hands of myriad tribal militias that the central government could never control.
Last week, the importance of the tribes to American strategy became clear when the leaders of the Shinwari tribe in eastern Afghanistan agreed to work with the government and forbid cooperation with the Taliban. The pact was announced as a major first step for the American effort to win over the tribes.
It was not the first time outsiders have turned to Afghanistan’s tribes as allies and surrogates. The British, who fought Russia for control of the region in the 19th century, brought with them a practice of enlisting local leaders. After the British departed, Afghan kings in Kabul relied on the tribal structure to maintain stability and order in remote areas.
But then came Communism in the mid-1970s, which viewed tribes as archaic obstacles to social progress and, most important, as a potential threat to party leaders’ hold on power. Hundreds of tribal elders were taken from their homes and killed in a series of brutal crackdowns.
At the same time, the United States, backed by the Saudi and Pakistani governments, unleashed its own assault on Afghanistan’s tribes. American-backed Wahhabi fundamentalism created hundreds of thousands of young mujahadeen “holy warriors” to attack Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Religiously indoctrinated and flush with American cash, these young Afghan fighters viewed Muslim clerics and mujahadeen commanders — not tribal elders — as their true leaders.
Once the Soviets left — and in turn the Americans — mujahadeen commanders turned on each other and the Taliban emerged as a force that, though repressive, at least provided law and order. The Taliban emphasized Islam as the organizing principle for society and government, not tribes. Across the country, little-known Muslim clerics ran government ministries, provinces and cities. Tribal elders were again ignored.
Since being toppled in 2001, the Taliban have mercilessly targeted tribal elders who support the Karzai government, apparently viewing them as one of their greatest potential rivals. At the same time, President Karzai’s weak government has struggled to protect and strengthen tribal elders, hundreds of whom have been killed in assassinations and bomb attacks.
One hallmark of the American agreement with the Shinwari tribe is that $1 million in American development aid will go directly to Shinwari elders. The money will bypass Karzai government officials, whom Shinwari elders dismiss as corrupt and ineffective.
Here is a rough picture of Afghanistan’s traditional tribal structure and its leading tribes, as well as a description of how a reinvigorated tribal system — in theory — should work.
NYT
Nonetheless, American civilian and military leaders are turning to some of these tribes as potentially their best hope for success against the resurgent Taliban after being frustrated by the weak central leadership of President Hamid Karzai.
Tribes have existed for millennia in the area that is present-day Afghanistan. They emerged over centuries in various sections of the country, taking form along extended kinship lines. Led by councils of elders, tribes provided their members with protection, financial support, a means to resolve disputes, and punishment of those who had committed crimes or broken tribal codes of conduct.
For Pashtuns, the country’s largest ethnic group and the Taliban’s primary source of support, tribes are particularly important. Successfully turning Pashtun tribes against the Taliban — or perhaps families or sub-tribes if they deal with the government on their own — could deliver a serious blow to the insurgency and potentially create a means of stabilizing the long-suffering country.
Some Afghans, though, warn that the tribal system is not a panacea and fear that the United States is adopting a quick-fix approach that will not create long-term stability. They see the tribes as inherently anachronistic, sexist and corrupt — a system that further undermines the already extraordinarily difficult task of creating multiethnic, merit-based national institutions. They warn that the country would be thrown into the hands of myriad tribal militias that the central government could never control.
Last week, the importance of the tribes to American strategy became clear when the leaders of the Shinwari tribe in eastern Afghanistan agreed to work with the government and forbid cooperation with the Taliban. The pact was announced as a major first step for the American effort to win over the tribes.
It was not the first time outsiders have turned to Afghanistan’s tribes as allies and surrogates. The British, who fought Russia for control of the region in the 19th century, brought with them a practice of enlisting local leaders. After the British departed, Afghan kings in Kabul relied on the tribal structure to maintain stability and order in remote areas.
But then came Communism in the mid-1970s, which viewed tribes as archaic obstacles to social progress and, most important, as a potential threat to party leaders’ hold on power. Hundreds of tribal elders were taken from their homes and killed in a series of brutal crackdowns.
At the same time, the United States, backed by the Saudi and Pakistani governments, unleashed its own assault on Afghanistan’s tribes. American-backed Wahhabi fundamentalism created hundreds of thousands of young mujahadeen “holy warriors” to attack Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Religiously indoctrinated and flush with American cash, these young Afghan fighters viewed Muslim clerics and mujahadeen commanders — not tribal elders — as their true leaders.
Once the Soviets left — and in turn the Americans — mujahadeen commanders turned on each other and the Taliban emerged as a force that, though repressive, at least provided law and order. The Taliban emphasized Islam as the organizing principle for society and government, not tribes. Across the country, little-known Muslim clerics ran government ministries, provinces and cities. Tribal elders were again ignored.
Since being toppled in 2001, the Taliban have mercilessly targeted tribal elders who support the Karzai government, apparently viewing them as one of their greatest potential rivals. At the same time, President Karzai’s weak government has struggled to protect and strengthen tribal elders, hundreds of whom have been killed in assassinations and bomb attacks.
One hallmark of the American agreement with the Shinwari tribe is that $1 million in American development aid will go directly to Shinwari elders. The money will bypass Karzai government officials, whom Shinwari elders dismiss as corrupt and ineffective.
Here is a rough picture of Afghanistan’s traditional tribal structure and its leading tribes, as well as a description of how a reinvigorated tribal system — in theory — should work.
NYT
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