.Cache deals: For troops in Afghanistan who depend on tips from locals, trust is everything
PAKTIA PROVINCE, Afghanistan — The soldiers were skeptical as they approached the suspected cache site. It was just a couple kilometers from their combat outpost, and the soil did not appear to be disturbed in the least. It was also the first time a source walked in off the street with a tip about hidden weapons in the three months that Troop B, 1st Squadron, 40th Cavalry Regiment had been at Combat Outpost Deysie.
A trio of soldiers scraped away the rocky top soil without seeing anything. They plunged their trenching tools first one foot deep and then two feet deep. One of them began swearing at the futility of it, but they pressed on. Then one of the shovels struck plastic. The soldiers would eventually unearth two rocket motors, about 100 landmines, 13 artillery rounds, 10 rockets, five rock-propelled grenades, five mortar rounds and about 1,250 rounds of ammunition.
The tip was good.
Like Troop B, U.S. units occupying new bases face an altogether different set of intelligence challenges and opportunities when they arrive in Afghanistan than those taking over more established sites. The troop’s predecessor established COP Deysie in November, just as winter weather started to make it difficult to venture into surrounding areas.
When most new units arrive, the troops they are replacing introduce them to the area’s key leaders and sources. Troop B met some key leaders, but many of the villages in the area haven’t seen an American presence in more than a year. Meanwhile, the troop’s intelligence team had to start building sources from scratch. The people’s support is key because they are the ones who know how to uncover hard-to-find insurgent cells.
"I can only do so much on my own," said Capt. Gary McDonald, the Troop B commander.
This trust can be hard to come by. Afghan villagers have grown accustomed to not choosing sides because that could have been fatal in the past, McDonald said. Instead, they might passively allow the Taliban to go about their business. Locals’ past experience with foreigners — particularly the Soviets — can also make them suspicious, while the area’s lack of education adds to the problem, he said.
Getting a fresh start does have its own advantages, though. Units that didn’t understand or fully embrace a counterinsurgency approach used tactics that did more to alienate the population than win them over, said Sgt. 1st Class Chad Cook, a Troop B platoon sergeant. He gave the example of a unit that destroyed a mill, a decision that soldiers who moved into the area later had to overcome.
"We haven’t had an opportunity to make a mistake like that yet," Cook said.
Said McDonald: "This is our area to lose. If the people flip on us and start changing their support for us, that definitely tells us we’re doing something wrong."
Troop B is doing everything it can to ensure this doesn’t happen. They have a small reward program and tip line that people listening to the American-initiated radio station can call in. But McDonald said the most important thing is the ability and performance shown by American and Afghan forces. Frightened villages must be so convinced of coalition support that they have the courage to resist insurgent threats.
Staff Sgt. Jamieson Barnes, who helped dig out the hidden weapons, said he can already feel that support growing. He spent 15 months in Iraq in 2006 and 2007, and he feels that Paktia residents are more cooperative than the Iraqis back then.
"The locals down here just make it so much easier," Barnes said.
`Stars & Stripes
A trio of soldiers scraped away the rocky top soil without seeing anything. They plunged their trenching tools first one foot deep and then two feet deep. One of them began swearing at the futility of it, but they pressed on. Then one of the shovels struck plastic. The soldiers would eventually unearth two rocket motors, about 100 landmines, 13 artillery rounds, 10 rockets, five rock-propelled grenades, five mortar rounds and about 1,250 rounds of ammunition.
The tip was good.
Like Troop B, U.S. units occupying new bases face an altogether different set of intelligence challenges and opportunities when they arrive in Afghanistan than those taking over more established sites. The troop’s predecessor established COP Deysie in November, just as winter weather started to make it difficult to venture into surrounding areas.
When most new units arrive, the troops they are replacing introduce them to the area’s key leaders and sources. Troop B met some key leaders, but many of the villages in the area haven’t seen an American presence in more than a year. Meanwhile, the troop’s intelligence team had to start building sources from scratch. The people’s support is key because they are the ones who know how to uncover hard-to-find insurgent cells.
"I can only do so much on my own," said Capt. Gary McDonald, the Troop B commander.
This trust can be hard to come by. Afghan villagers have grown accustomed to not choosing sides because that could have been fatal in the past, McDonald said. Instead, they might passively allow the Taliban to go about their business. Locals’ past experience with foreigners — particularly the Soviets — can also make them suspicious, while the area’s lack of education adds to the problem, he said.
Getting a fresh start does have its own advantages, though. Units that didn’t understand or fully embrace a counterinsurgency approach used tactics that did more to alienate the population than win them over, said Sgt. 1st Class Chad Cook, a Troop B platoon sergeant. He gave the example of a unit that destroyed a mill, a decision that soldiers who moved into the area later had to overcome.
"We haven’t had an opportunity to make a mistake like that yet," Cook said.
Said McDonald: "This is our area to lose. If the people flip on us and start changing their support for us, that definitely tells us we’re doing something wrong."
Troop B is doing everything it can to ensure this doesn’t happen. They have a small reward program and tip line that people listening to the American-initiated radio station can call in. But McDonald said the most important thing is the ability and performance shown by American and Afghan forces. Frightened villages must be so convinced of coalition support that they have the courage to resist insurgent threats.
Staff Sgt. Jamieson Barnes, who helped dig out the hidden weapons, said he can already feel that support growing. He spent 15 months in Iraq in 2006 and 2007, and he feels that Paktia residents are more cooperative than the Iraqis back then.
"The locals down here just make it so much easier," Barnes said.
`Stars & Stripes
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