.Are German Anti-Pirate Forces Hampered by Bureaucrats?
A review of the political complexities behind a recent aborted anti-pirate operation off the coast of Africa has revealed that German security agencies tend to fight each other sooner than the enemy. Politicians in Berlin are trying to draw lessons from the failed mission.
The return of the would-be heroes from Harardhere took place almost as quietly as their departure three weeks earlier. After landing at Cologne-Bonn last Tuesday evening, the chartered flight from Mombasa was directed to a military section of the airport, where nondescript-looking busses awaited the 200 members of Germany's GSG-9 elite federal police unit.
There was no champagne, no buffet, no cameras, no press. It wasn't the reception that GSG-9 chief Olaf Lindner, or August Hanning, a junior secretary at the Interior Ministry, had in mind. Hanning had made a special trip to Cologne to greet the frustrated elite troops. He had trouble hiding his disappointment.
Lindner gave Hanning another detailed account of the highly successful dress rehearsal for storming the German freighter, the Hansa Stavanger. He also explained how thrilled the US special forces were with the Germans. And he said US colleagues on the American helicopter carrier the USS Boxer were extremely impressed with the Germans' cutting-edge equipment.
Hanning knew the rest. Ever since Somali pirates had boarded and hijacked the Hansa Stavanger on April 4, and abducted the crew, including five German sailors, a crisis team had met almost every day in Berlin. Hanning himself had to announce that the US government had pulled the plug on the GSG-9 operation off the coast of the Somali pirate stronghold of Harardhere roughly two weeks ago. He'd witnessed the squabbling among ministries in Berlin, the complicated and contradictory levels of decision-making, the political blame game.
But how could he explain to the demotivated men of GSG-9 that operative ability and a political will to conduct foreign operations were sometimes light-years apart? How could he break the news to Germany's elite forces that, when in doubt, German bureaucrats were more prepared to fight each other than to tackle Somali pirates?
It's not the same as, say, the Labor Ministry in Berlin squabbling with colleagues from the Family Ministry over the details of rent subsidies -- or the economics minister attacking the finance minister because he doesn't agree with the amount of money offered under Germany's car-scrapping bonus plan. That's all part of business as usual in a democracy.
But when the Foreign, Defense, and Interior Ministries lock horns while thousands of kilometers away a strike team waits for orders, then it's no longer democratic business as usual -- it's a matter of national security.
'Post-Heroic' Politics
The failed Somali mission can also be explained by the fact that, since the end of World War II, Germany has been reluctant to engage in violent interventions -- in contrast to the US and France, which used their militaries to secure the release of hostages over the past few weeks. In the words of Berlin political scientist Herfried Münkler, Germany is a "post-heroic society." Two decades after the end of the Cold War, the country would like to play a key role on the international stage. But it's rarely prepared to bear the consequences.
The typical German response to hijacking and hostage threats has been the way of the bank account, not the special military mission. Since this strategy tends to save hostages' lives, a broad consensus has emerged among the general public that ransom payments are acceptable. But paying ransom, in the long run, is an inadequate response to the asymmetrical warfare conducted by Afghan Taliban fighters and Somali pirates. There's a world of difference between Berlin sensitivities and the raw realities of a failed state.
Over the past few months, these realities prompted German Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble of the center-right Christian Democrats (CDU), and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier of the left-leaning Social Democrats (SPD), to search for an alternative. They'd had enough of checkbook diplomacy, so they decided to organize an aggressive hostage rescue to send a strong signal to the pirates not to mess with Germany.
The Germans proved themselves last Thursday when the special forces command of the German military, or KSK, captured a Taliban leader in a spectacular operation in northern Afghanistan. After the flop in Somalia, it was a sign that Germany would resist falling back into old patterns.
But news of the Afghan military operation also shed cruel light on the reasons the hostage rescue operation off the coast of Harardhere was doomed to fail. The Bundeswehr, or German military, is solely responsible for the KSK elite unit, but no less than three ministries were involved in the planned GSG-9 operation: Foreign, Interior and Defense. The German Federal Police, the Bundeswehr and various commando and leadership levels also wrangled over power and influence. The scuppered operation to free the hostages illustrates what is wrong with the nation's security architecture.
Germany's closest allies operate differently in such crises. In France and the US the presidents decide whether hostages abroad should be freed by force. Then experts on the ground carry out the plan as well as they can, and if it fails, the president -- as commander in chief -- takes the heat.
Government leaders in Berlin prefer to pass such issues down the ladder, where interministerial struggles often take over. It can be impossible to reconstruct afterwards just who supported and who opposed a given operation. This is compounded by a chancellor who, as a matter out of principle, avoids commitment, issues no directives and delegates problems to her cabinet.
There are "no recognizable coordination efforts from the chancellery," says Sascha Lange from a think tank called the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Merkel dispatched only a departmental head to the crisis team meetings, while she herself took a trip over the Easter break -- right in the middle of the critical operational planning phase -- and enjoyed a holiday on the Italian resort island of Ischia. Merkel's chief of staff Thomas de Maizière was briefed on the situation, but he indicated no preference for a particular course of action.
With no firm political leadership, the squabbles between participating ministries can spiral out of control. The German Foreign Office heads the crisis team and thus has the job of freeing the hostages -- but it has no authority over an operation by the GSG-9. The elite police force is under command of the German interior minister, who cannot deploy the commandos without the defense minister, whose navy patrols the Indian Ocean to combat piracy.
Everyone is in charge, in other words, but no one is at the helm.
The chancellor has maintained a safe distance from all participants. She seems unwilling to risk a botched operation just a few months before an upcoming election. This would make the foreign minister -- her rival in the fall -- responsible for any fiasco. If the GSG-9 mission had failed, Interior Minister Schäuble might have resigned too, because he, according to German law, has to give the final strike order together with the foreign minister. Merkel could have dodged any political flak.
Two Warring Units
This lack of political leadership is compounded by other problems. The German government has two elite units intended for crisis situations like the one in Somalia. Both have their hands slightly tied. The KSK was established in 1996 to "save and evacuate" Germans in trouble abroad, but this military force is chronically undermanned and hard pressed in Afghanistan. Only some 200 out of a total of 400 available positions in the German special forces are currently filled, meaning that the KSK is unavailable for missions in Somalia. KSK operations also require approval by the German parliament.
The roughly 200 men of the GSG-9 police unit are perfectly trained for hostage-taking situations, but they have trouble reaching remote locations. The GSG-9 is therefore dependent on the military's aircraft and ships.
Why can't the GSG-9 and KSK cooperate to balance these deficits? The answer is simple and sobering: The two units can't stand each other, and the aversion grows every time they try to work together.
Spats, Rivalries, Contradictory Field Assessments
Ever since the two elite units freed hostages last summer, "they haven't been on good speaking terms," says a member of the military. At the time, a group of criminals in the border region between Egypt and Sudan had abducted 11 tourists, including five Germans. The German government dispatched over 100 GSG-9 police along with KSK forces, workers with the Federal Agency for Technical Relief, and Transall cargo planes.
The hostages were released before the special units could fire a shot. But the actual trench warfare took place between GSG-9 head Lindner and KSK Brigadier General Hans-Christoph Ammon. The police were afraid that the KSK wanted to seize command of the operation, and the army was annoyed because the GSG-9 had sent an advance commando before the KSK units had reached the area.
The soldiers were particularly offended by a show staged by the police when they returned to Germany. At the airport in Berlin, the GSG-9 men ostentatiously lined up in front of their Lufthansa plane in parade formation -- without their usual masks. While the police filed past, the KSK soldiers had to stay humbly in their seats, waiting for the photographers to disappear, so no one could recognize them.
In Berlin the GSG-9 is said to be better suited for missions like the one in Egypt. But the aborted mission in Somalia also revealed a range of weaknesses. Spats, rivalries and contradictory field assessments are certainly not limited to interactions with the KSK. During the Somalia mission there were also deep divisions within the Federal Police that nearly immobilized the agency. Police overrode police, and the head of operations in Potsdam contradicted the head of operations on board the US helicopter carrier Boxer. It became clear that the German Federal Police, which had been reformed only a year ago, wasn't equipped to handle crises, or at least not a crisis on the other side of the globe.
A Fair-Weather Structure
On April 4, after the first reports reached Germany that the Hansa Stavanger had been seized by pirates, the country's police force formed a special organizational structure which was to be based in Potsdam, at the headquarters of the Federal Police. The command was assumed by Joachim Franklin, head of the Federal Police Regional Headquarters in Bad Bramstedt, where he could be responsible for emergencies at sea.
This made Franklin the most important man in the operation. But he was 6,000 km (3,700 miles) from Harardhere.
Under Franklin's command was GSG-9 head Lindner, as "on-scene commander." This fair-weather structure is outstandingly well suited to handling domestic disasters like a train wreck in Germany's industrial heartland, or even a hostage situation at a small bank in the otherwise quiet town of Winsen an der Luhe. It's unsuitable for freeing a freighter in a remote corner of the world, where criminals have the upper hand.
While Lindner had access to reconnaissance aircraft photographs, US military analyses and on-location reports, the Federal Police in Potsdam had to rely on other sources to assess the situation for the Interior Ministry, including freely available information such as Google Maps on the Internet. This conflict came to a head in the last few days before the mission. Franklin made an appointment with Interior Ministry State Secretary Hanning to voice his concerns.
Franklin said the Federal Police in Potsdam was advising against the operation -- it was too risky. He said it was still unclear where the hostages were being held on the ship, and he added that the time between the possible discovery of the attack commando and the boarding of the Stavanger was too long. Berlin was left with the impression that the man from the Federal Police wanted to abort the operation.
In fact, the situation looked very different in the Indian Ocean. While Franklin was conveying his concerns in Berlin, Lindner was training his troops day and night. The GSG-9 tested rappelling from the air and using suction equipment to climb the side of a vessel. The US Navy SEALs on board the USS Boxer assisted during these exercises, adding to a growing sense of optimism on board the helicopter carrier. On April 27, the Monday before the planned operation, Lindner wired an upbeat risk assessment to Berlin. But he said the dress rehearsal would determine the final decision.
The last rehearsal was conducted during the night from Tuesday to Wednesday. According to sources in Berlin, the result was "outstanding." Lindner now believed he could launch the operation with a justifiable amount of risk. He'd also picked a specific time. He wanted the GSG-9 to strike early on May 1, Friday morning. Just a few hours before US National Security Advisor James Jones withdrew American support for the operation, the GSG-9 commander sent his optimistic message to Berlin.
But who or what had moved Jones to pull the plug on the mission? There is a rumor circulating in a number of ministries and agencies in Berlin that the Bundeswehr had contributed to this decision with critical assessments of the situation, which had allegedly also been sent to US Central Command in Bahrain. According to this version of events, although the commanders on board the Boxer supported the operation, the headquarters in Bahrain voted against it in Washington.
The decision prompted Hanning to ask his counterpart from the Defense Ministry, Peter Wichert, for a word on the sidelines of the crisis team. He wanted to know if there was any truth to the rumor. Had the Bundeswehr actually passed on a statement to the Americans? Wichert denied it. No such statement had been issued, he said.
'The Sword is Dull'
In the wake of the failed Somalia mission, most of the major players in Berlin now realize that things can't continue in the same vein. There won't be a second operation without reforms because "the sword," as a high-ranking official from the crisis team says, "is dull." A repeat failure is too predictable. Interior Minister Schäuble and Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung now want to hold talks with other European countries and the US government to ensure that the transport of the GSG-9 at sea and in the air will go smoothly in the future.
"Germany apparently can't resolve hostage crises like this on its own, but is instead reliant on outside help," says Peter Struck, a former defense minister who leads the Social Democrats' parliamentary faction, and "we have to seriously consider the question of whether we should build up our own capabilities to handle similar situations."
Both special units lack large cargo aircraft for long-distance transports, big ships to transfer troops, reconnaissance instruments and modern communications technology. "The deficits are well-known," says defense expert Lange with biting sarcasm. "We've been debating them for 15 years."
Little has apparently changed since the first foreign mission by Bundeswehr infantry and supply troops. In 1994, US and German units beat a hasty retreat after abandoning the disastrous United Nations operation in Somalia. Since the Americans didn't allow their allies on board their landing ships, the Bundeswehr had to evacuate its rearguard troops by cramming them onto a narrow frigate. After the recent failed GSG-9 mission, Defense Minister Jung may exhume old plans for a German landing ship.
More equipment alone won't be enough. From now on, Germany will undoubtedly avoid having dual strategists in Potsdam and on location in the field. Birgit Homburger, a defense expert with the opposition liberal Free Democrats, is calling for a new policy decision to use the KSK instead of the GSG-9 in the future. She says this would place the leadership of an operation "unequivocally under one agency" -- the military. Her SPD colleague Rainer Arnold advocates that the two units should at least "train together and collaborate."
Schäuble took Jung aside during a cabinet meeting last week. He wanted to know if the Defense Ministry would be willing to station a kind of mobile task force consisting of KSK soldiers and frogmen on the German frigates in the Indian Ocean, at least as a provisional measure? This could make it possible to quickly end hijackings before the seized ships reach the pirate ports on the coast. Jung remained noncommittal.
He's aware that Schäuble's suggestions don't have a good track record. In response to a request by the Interior Ministry, Jung sent a submarine to Somalia to secretly observe the pirate stronghold from periscope depth and drop off GSG-9 men. On the way there, the much-praised fuel cell propulsion system -- which allows the world's most advanced conventional submarine to stay under water for weeks on end -- came to a grinding halt. Before it even reached the Suez Canal, U-34 was stopped in the Mediterranean by engine trouble.
Spiegel
The return of the would-be heroes from Harardhere took place almost as quietly as their departure three weeks earlier. After landing at Cologne-Bonn last Tuesday evening, the chartered flight from Mombasa was directed to a military section of the airport, where nondescript-looking busses awaited the 200 members of Germany's GSG-9 elite federal police unit.
There was no champagne, no buffet, no cameras, no press. It wasn't the reception that GSG-9 chief Olaf Lindner, or August Hanning, a junior secretary at the Interior Ministry, had in mind. Hanning had made a special trip to Cologne to greet the frustrated elite troops. He had trouble hiding his disappointment.
Lindner gave Hanning another detailed account of the highly successful dress rehearsal for storming the German freighter, the Hansa Stavanger. He also explained how thrilled the US special forces were with the Germans. And he said US colleagues on the American helicopter carrier the USS Boxer were extremely impressed with the Germans' cutting-edge equipment.
Hanning knew the rest. Ever since Somali pirates had boarded and hijacked the Hansa Stavanger on April 4, and abducted the crew, including five German sailors, a crisis team had met almost every day in Berlin. Hanning himself had to announce that the US government had pulled the plug on the GSG-9 operation off the coast of the Somali pirate stronghold of Harardhere roughly two weeks ago. He'd witnessed the squabbling among ministries in Berlin, the complicated and contradictory levels of decision-making, the political blame game.
But how could he explain to the demotivated men of GSG-9 that operative ability and a political will to conduct foreign operations were sometimes light-years apart? How could he break the news to Germany's elite forces that, when in doubt, German bureaucrats were more prepared to fight each other than to tackle Somali pirates?
It's not the same as, say, the Labor Ministry in Berlin squabbling with colleagues from the Family Ministry over the details of rent subsidies -- or the economics minister attacking the finance minister because he doesn't agree with the amount of money offered under Germany's car-scrapping bonus plan. That's all part of business as usual in a democracy.
But when the Foreign, Defense, and Interior Ministries lock horns while thousands of kilometers away a strike team waits for orders, then it's no longer democratic business as usual -- it's a matter of national security.
'Post-Heroic' Politics
The failed Somali mission can also be explained by the fact that, since the end of World War II, Germany has been reluctant to engage in violent interventions -- in contrast to the US and France, which used their militaries to secure the release of hostages over the past few weeks. In the words of Berlin political scientist Herfried Münkler, Germany is a "post-heroic society." Two decades after the end of the Cold War, the country would like to play a key role on the international stage. But it's rarely prepared to bear the consequences.
The typical German response to hijacking and hostage threats has been the way of the bank account, not the special military mission. Since this strategy tends to save hostages' lives, a broad consensus has emerged among the general public that ransom payments are acceptable. But paying ransom, in the long run, is an inadequate response to the asymmetrical warfare conducted by Afghan Taliban fighters and Somali pirates. There's a world of difference between Berlin sensitivities and the raw realities of a failed state.
Over the past few months, these realities prompted German Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble of the center-right Christian Democrats (CDU), and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier of the left-leaning Social Democrats (SPD), to search for an alternative. They'd had enough of checkbook diplomacy, so they decided to organize an aggressive hostage rescue to send a strong signal to the pirates not to mess with Germany.
The Germans proved themselves last Thursday when the special forces command of the German military, or KSK, captured a Taliban leader in a spectacular operation in northern Afghanistan. After the flop in Somalia, it was a sign that Germany would resist falling back into old patterns.
But news of the Afghan military operation also shed cruel light on the reasons the hostage rescue operation off the coast of Harardhere was doomed to fail. The Bundeswehr, or German military, is solely responsible for the KSK elite unit, but no less than three ministries were involved in the planned GSG-9 operation: Foreign, Interior and Defense. The German Federal Police, the Bundeswehr and various commando and leadership levels also wrangled over power and influence. The scuppered operation to free the hostages illustrates what is wrong with the nation's security architecture.
Germany's closest allies operate differently in such crises. In France and the US the presidents decide whether hostages abroad should be freed by force. Then experts on the ground carry out the plan as well as they can, and if it fails, the president -- as commander in chief -- takes the heat.
Government leaders in Berlin prefer to pass such issues down the ladder, where interministerial struggles often take over. It can be impossible to reconstruct afterwards just who supported and who opposed a given operation. This is compounded by a chancellor who, as a matter out of principle, avoids commitment, issues no directives and delegates problems to her cabinet.
There are "no recognizable coordination efforts from the chancellery," says Sascha Lange from a think tank called the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Merkel dispatched only a departmental head to the crisis team meetings, while she herself took a trip over the Easter break -- right in the middle of the critical operational planning phase -- and enjoyed a holiday on the Italian resort island of Ischia. Merkel's chief of staff Thomas de Maizière was briefed on the situation, but he indicated no preference for a particular course of action.
With no firm political leadership, the squabbles between participating ministries can spiral out of control. The German Foreign Office heads the crisis team and thus has the job of freeing the hostages -- but it has no authority over an operation by the GSG-9. The elite police force is under command of the German interior minister, who cannot deploy the commandos without the defense minister, whose navy patrols the Indian Ocean to combat piracy.
Everyone is in charge, in other words, but no one is at the helm.
The chancellor has maintained a safe distance from all participants. She seems unwilling to risk a botched operation just a few months before an upcoming election. This would make the foreign minister -- her rival in the fall -- responsible for any fiasco. If the GSG-9 mission had failed, Interior Minister Schäuble might have resigned too, because he, according to German law, has to give the final strike order together with the foreign minister. Merkel could have dodged any political flak.
Two Warring Units
This lack of political leadership is compounded by other problems. The German government has two elite units intended for crisis situations like the one in Somalia. Both have their hands slightly tied. The KSK was established in 1996 to "save and evacuate" Germans in trouble abroad, but this military force is chronically undermanned and hard pressed in Afghanistan. Only some 200 out of a total of 400 available positions in the German special forces are currently filled, meaning that the KSK is unavailable for missions in Somalia. KSK operations also require approval by the German parliament.
The roughly 200 men of the GSG-9 police unit are perfectly trained for hostage-taking situations, but they have trouble reaching remote locations. The GSG-9 is therefore dependent on the military's aircraft and ships.
Why can't the GSG-9 and KSK cooperate to balance these deficits? The answer is simple and sobering: The two units can't stand each other, and the aversion grows every time they try to work together.
Spats, Rivalries, Contradictory Field Assessments
Ever since the two elite units freed hostages last summer, "they haven't been on good speaking terms," says a member of the military. At the time, a group of criminals in the border region between Egypt and Sudan had abducted 11 tourists, including five Germans. The German government dispatched over 100 GSG-9 police along with KSK forces, workers with the Federal Agency for Technical Relief, and Transall cargo planes.
The hostages were released before the special units could fire a shot. But the actual trench warfare took place between GSG-9 head Lindner and KSK Brigadier General Hans-Christoph Ammon. The police were afraid that the KSK wanted to seize command of the operation, and the army was annoyed because the GSG-9 had sent an advance commando before the KSK units had reached the area.
The soldiers were particularly offended by a show staged by the police when they returned to Germany. At the airport in Berlin, the GSG-9 men ostentatiously lined up in front of their Lufthansa plane in parade formation -- without their usual masks. While the police filed past, the KSK soldiers had to stay humbly in their seats, waiting for the photographers to disappear, so no one could recognize them.
In Berlin the GSG-9 is said to be better suited for missions like the one in Egypt. But the aborted mission in Somalia also revealed a range of weaknesses. Spats, rivalries and contradictory field assessments are certainly not limited to interactions with the KSK. During the Somalia mission there were also deep divisions within the Federal Police that nearly immobilized the agency. Police overrode police, and the head of operations in Potsdam contradicted the head of operations on board the US helicopter carrier Boxer. It became clear that the German Federal Police, which had been reformed only a year ago, wasn't equipped to handle crises, or at least not a crisis on the other side of the globe.
A Fair-Weather Structure
On April 4, after the first reports reached Germany that the Hansa Stavanger had been seized by pirates, the country's police force formed a special organizational structure which was to be based in Potsdam, at the headquarters of the Federal Police. The command was assumed by Joachim Franklin, head of the Federal Police Regional Headquarters in Bad Bramstedt, where he could be responsible for emergencies at sea.
This made Franklin the most important man in the operation. But he was 6,000 km (3,700 miles) from Harardhere.
Under Franklin's command was GSG-9 head Lindner, as "on-scene commander." This fair-weather structure is outstandingly well suited to handling domestic disasters like a train wreck in Germany's industrial heartland, or even a hostage situation at a small bank in the otherwise quiet town of Winsen an der Luhe. It's unsuitable for freeing a freighter in a remote corner of the world, where criminals have the upper hand.
While Lindner had access to reconnaissance aircraft photographs, US military analyses and on-location reports, the Federal Police in Potsdam had to rely on other sources to assess the situation for the Interior Ministry, including freely available information such as Google Maps on the Internet. This conflict came to a head in the last few days before the mission. Franklin made an appointment with Interior Ministry State Secretary Hanning to voice his concerns.
Franklin said the Federal Police in Potsdam was advising against the operation -- it was too risky. He said it was still unclear where the hostages were being held on the ship, and he added that the time between the possible discovery of the attack commando and the boarding of the Stavanger was too long. Berlin was left with the impression that the man from the Federal Police wanted to abort the operation.
In fact, the situation looked very different in the Indian Ocean. While Franklin was conveying his concerns in Berlin, Lindner was training his troops day and night. The GSG-9 tested rappelling from the air and using suction equipment to climb the side of a vessel. The US Navy SEALs on board the USS Boxer assisted during these exercises, adding to a growing sense of optimism on board the helicopter carrier. On April 27, the Monday before the planned operation, Lindner wired an upbeat risk assessment to Berlin. But he said the dress rehearsal would determine the final decision.
The last rehearsal was conducted during the night from Tuesday to Wednesday. According to sources in Berlin, the result was "outstanding." Lindner now believed he could launch the operation with a justifiable amount of risk. He'd also picked a specific time. He wanted the GSG-9 to strike early on May 1, Friday morning. Just a few hours before US National Security Advisor James Jones withdrew American support for the operation, the GSG-9 commander sent his optimistic message to Berlin.
But who or what had moved Jones to pull the plug on the mission? There is a rumor circulating in a number of ministries and agencies in Berlin that the Bundeswehr had contributed to this decision with critical assessments of the situation, which had allegedly also been sent to US Central Command in Bahrain. According to this version of events, although the commanders on board the Boxer supported the operation, the headquarters in Bahrain voted against it in Washington.
The decision prompted Hanning to ask his counterpart from the Defense Ministry, Peter Wichert, for a word on the sidelines of the crisis team. He wanted to know if there was any truth to the rumor. Had the Bundeswehr actually passed on a statement to the Americans? Wichert denied it. No such statement had been issued, he said.
'The Sword is Dull'
In the wake of the failed Somalia mission, most of the major players in Berlin now realize that things can't continue in the same vein. There won't be a second operation without reforms because "the sword," as a high-ranking official from the crisis team says, "is dull." A repeat failure is too predictable. Interior Minister Schäuble and Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung now want to hold talks with other European countries and the US government to ensure that the transport of the GSG-9 at sea and in the air will go smoothly in the future.
"Germany apparently can't resolve hostage crises like this on its own, but is instead reliant on outside help," says Peter Struck, a former defense minister who leads the Social Democrats' parliamentary faction, and "we have to seriously consider the question of whether we should build up our own capabilities to handle similar situations."
Both special units lack large cargo aircraft for long-distance transports, big ships to transfer troops, reconnaissance instruments and modern communications technology. "The deficits are well-known," says defense expert Lange with biting sarcasm. "We've been debating them for 15 years."
Little has apparently changed since the first foreign mission by Bundeswehr infantry and supply troops. In 1994, US and German units beat a hasty retreat after abandoning the disastrous United Nations operation in Somalia. Since the Americans didn't allow their allies on board their landing ships, the Bundeswehr had to evacuate its rearguard troops by cramming them onto a narrow frigate. After the recent failed GSG-9 mission, Defense Minister Jung may exhume old plans for a German landing ship.
More equipment alone won't be enough. From now on, Germany will undoubtedly avoid having dual strategists in Potsdam and on location in the field. Birgit Homburger, a defense expert with the opposition liberal Free Democrats, is calling for a new policy decision to use the KSK instead of the GSG-9 in the future. She says this would place the leadership of an operation "unequivocally under one agency" -- the military. Her SPD colleague Rainer Arnold advocates that the two units should at least "train together and collaborate."
Schäuble took Jung aside during a cabinet meeting last week. He wanted to know if the Defense Ministry would be willing to station a kind of mobile task force consisting of KSK soldiers and frogmen on the German frigates in the Indian Ocean, at least as a provisional measure? This could make it possible to quickly end hijackings before the seized ships reach the pirate ports on the coast. Jung remained noncommittal.
He's aware that Schäuble's suggestions don't have a good track record. In response to a request by the Interior Ministry, Jung sent a submarine to Somalia to secretly observe the pirate stronghold from periscope depth and drop off GSG-9 men. On the way there, the much-praised fuel cell propulsion system -- which allows the world's most advanced conventional submarine to stay under water for weeks on end -- came to a grinding halt. Before it even reached the Suez Canal, U-34 was stopped in the Mediterranean by engine trouble.
Spiegel
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