.A Russia Reality Check
MUNICH -- As European leaders listened joyfully here to the Obama administration's first expressions of foreign policy, nothing pleased them more than Vice President Biden's vow "to press the reset button" in relations with Russia.
When it came to Russia, the mood among the premiers, foreign ministers and other pooh-bahs gathered for the annual Munich Conference on Security Policy was: Why can't we be friends?
Over the past year, Russia has invaded the sovereign state of Georgia, parts of which it continues to occupy; cut off natural gas to parts of Europe during the depth of winter; sold weapons to Iran and Venezuela; and otherwise made itself disagreeable. As with issues involving Iran, the Middle East, Afghanistan and elsewhere, many Europeans, and some American participants, too, seemed to hope that, with George W. Bush gone, maybe the thorniest problems involving Vladimir Putin would melt away, too.
Biden, to his credit, did not indulge any naive hopes, with regard to Russia or foreign policy in general. He cheered everyone with promises of "a new day" but warned U.S. allies that President Obama would be asking "for more from our partners, as well." The new administration would have its differences with Russia, he said, most notably by opposing "any nation having a sphere of influence."
But his overall tone on Russia was hopeful, as he promised that the administration would "revisit the many areas where we can and should be working together with Russia." That left many of his listeners hoping for a "grand bargain" that would mollify the Russian bear.
It's certainly worth trying for improved relations -- British Foreign Secretary David Miliband noted after Biden's speech that Russia's "incentive to be a partner" may be greater now that oil prices have fallen so precipitously -- but also worth asking what such a bargain might entail.
The West's wish list is long: for starters, Russian help in fighting terrorists, defeating the insurgency in Afghanistan, corralling loose nukes, and restraining the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran.
Almost since the Soviet Union collapsed more than 17 years ago, U.S. officials have been telling themselves that cooperation in such areas is graspable because their goals should be Russia's goals, too: Russia, they say, can't want fundamentalist insurgency to its south or new nuclear powers along its borders. For just as long, the Russians have not acted as though they are so sure their interests coincide: Sometimes they have helped, sometimes sabotaged, often promised just enough to keep the Americans begging for more. The past few days offered a typical performance: expressing sympathy for U.S. goals in Afghanistan while persuading Kyrgyzstan to boot U.S. forces out of an air base crucial to the Afghan war effort.
So what might Russia want, as distinct from what Americans think it should want? Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov, speaking to the conference the day before Biden, talked mostly about arms control, including the START treaty that the Bush administration had no interest in and that will expire in December. Faced with an American president committed to the treaty process and to the goal of reducing nuclear arms, the Russians may lose some of their enthusiasm. But it is certainly worth finding out.
Many of the Europeans here talked in oddly psychological terms, as if what Russia wants most is respect, understanding for its fall from empire, indulgence of its irrational fear of encirclement. If so, all the better; of course Russia should be treated with respect.
It seems more likely, though, that Russia is acting more on what it perceives as its interests than out of accumulated hurt feelings. And unfortunately, it seems to view its interests as exerting or maintaining control over neighboring states. That's why leaders here from Poland, Estonia and other Russian neighbors seemed more skeptical than Western Europeans of the possibility of warming relations.
Russia wants to derail a NATO missile-defense project directed at Iran, not because the deployment would threaten Russia or its nuclear arsenal -- it would not -- but because the system would be deployed in Poland and the Czech Republic, two former Warsaw Pact nations.
It wants to keep Georgia and Ukraine out of the European Union or NATO, because both countries used to be part of the Soviet Union. It does not want Europe building a natural-gas pipeline toward Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea, because that would threaten Russia's monopoly position, with which it enhances its political influence.
If such goals are at the top of Russia's wish list, then a grand bargain may prove more elusive than many people, on both sides of the Atlantic, hope. Though a serious diversification policy remains a distant goal, this winter's gas cutoff, the second such episode, seems to have convinced a good number of European officials that remaining at Russia's energy mercy is not the wisest idea.
And if some Western Europeans hoped that Obama might be more willing than his predecessor to sacrifice the interests of Russia's small neighbors to the West's larger strategic interests in Iran or elsewhere, Biden seemed to close that door yesterday.
"It will remain our view," the vice president said, "that sovereign states have the right to make their own decisions and choose their own alliances."
WaPo
Good luck with that.
When it came to Russia, the mood among the premiers, foreign ministers and other pooh-bahs gathered for the annual Munich Conference on Security Policy was: Why can't we be friends?
Over the past year, Russia has invaded the sovereign state of Georgia, parts of which it continues to occupy; cut off natural gas to parts of Europe during the depth of winter; sold weapons to Iran and Venezuela; and otherwise made itself disagreeable. As with issues involving Iran, the Middle East, Afghanistan and elsewhere, many Europeans, and some American participants, too, seemed to hope that, with George W. Bush gone, maybe the thorniest problems involving Vladimir Putin would melt away, too.
Biden, to his credit, did not indulge any naive hopes, with regard to Russia or foreign policy in general. He cheered everyone with promises of "a new day" but warned U.S. allies that President Obama would be asking "for more from our partners, as well." The new administration would have its differences with Russia, he said, most notably by opposing "any nation having a sphere of influence."
But his overall tone on Russia was hopeful, as he promised that the administration would "revisit the many areas where we can and should be working together with Russia." That left many of his listeners hoping for a "grand bargain" that would mollify the Russian bear.
It's certainly worth trying for improved relations -- British Foreign Secretary David Miliband noted after Biden's speech that Russia's "incentive to be a partner" may be greater now that oil prices have fallen so precipitously -- but also worth asking what such a bargain might entail.
The West's wish list is long: for starters, Russian help in fighting terrorists, defeating the insurgency in Afghanistan, corralling loose nukes, and restraining the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran.
Almost since the Soviet Union collapsed more than 17 years ago, U.S. officials have been telling themselves that cooperation in such areas is graspable because their goals should be Russia's goals, too: Russia, they say, can't want fundamentalist insurgency to its south or new nuclear powers along its borders. For just as long, the Russians have not acted as though they are so sure their interests coincide: Sometimes they have helped, sometimes sabotaged, often promised just enough to keep the Americans begging for more. The past few days offered a typical performance: expressing sympathy for U.S. goals in Afghanistan while persuading Kyrgyzstan to boot U.S. forces out of an air base crucial to the Afghan war effort.
So what might Russia want, as distinct from what Americans think it should want? Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov, speaking to the conference the day before Biden, talked mostly about arms control, including the START treaty that the Bush administration had no interest in and that will expire in December. Faced with an American president committed to the treaty process and to the goal of reducing nuclear arms, the Russians may lose some of their enthusiasm. But it is certainly worth finding out.
Many of the Europeans here talked in oddly psychological terms, as if what Russia wants most is respect, understanding for its fall from empire, indulgence of its irrational fear of encirclement. If so, all the better; of course Russia should be treated with respect.
It seems more likely, though, that Russia is acting more on what it perceives as its interests than out of accumulated hurt feelings. And unfortunately, it seems to view its interests as exerting or maintaining control over neighboring states. That's why leaders here from Poland, Estonia and other Russian neighbors seemed more skeptical than Western Europeans of the possibility of warming relations.
Russia wants to derail a NATO missile-defense project directed at Iran, not because the deployment would threaten Russia or its nuclear arsenal -- it would not -- but because the system would be deployed in Poland and the Czech Republic, two former Warsaw Pact nations.
It wants to keep Georgia and Ukraine out of the European Union or NATO, because both countries used to be part of the Soviet Union. It does not want Europe building a natural-gas pipeline toward Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea, because that would threaten Russia's monopoly position, with which it enhances its political influence.
If such goals are at the top of Russia's wish list, then a grand bargain may prove more elusive than many people, on both sides of the Atlantic, hope. Though a serious diversification policy remains a distant goal, this winter's gas cutoff, the second such episode, seems to have convinced a good number of European officials that remaining at Russia's energy mercy is not the wisest idea.
And if some Western Europeans hoped that Obama might be more willing than his predecessor to sacrifice the interests of Russia's small neighbors to the West's larger strategic interests in Iran or elsewhere, Biden seemed to close that door yesterday.
"It will remain our view," the vice president said, "that sovereign states have the right to make their own decisions and choose their own alliances."
WaPo
Good luck with that.
posted by madtom at 11:06 PM
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