Iraq strategy for a new leader
Opposition to the war in Iraq helped make Barack Obama president, but a misplayed endgame there could unmake his presidency.
On Jan. 20, Obama inherited an occupation characterized by greatly reduced levels of violence. If he pursues any policy that leads to ratcheting up the killing once more, Republicans are sure to point out that the disaster happened on his watch. This would seemingly confirm the stereotype about Democrats being less attuned to the demands of wartime strategy.
Just what might happen? The worry among military experts in both parties is that if Obama lives up to his campaign pledge of withdrawing a brigade a month, these reductions will be a signal to the terrorists and insurgents to sharpen their knives, set their bomb timers and ramp up the level of terrorism yet again.
One intelligence estimate leaked to the public suggests that renewed Sunni-Shiite strife might see 1 million people killed, absent U.S. forces.
There are other threats as well. Turkey might see more opportunity to make incursions in northern Iraq against the Kurds.
The Iranians would be drawn to fight alongside the Shiites, while neighboring Arab countries would support the Sunnis.
Worst case: "Congo on the Tigris" - a reprise of the civil war in Africa that saw seven countries send in armies over the past decade. About 4 million people dead, mostly innocent civilians.
Obama's plan would have us out of Iraq by summer 2010 - a year and a half sooner than required under the agreement that former President George W. Bush hammered out with Baghdad before he left office. The concern is that the shorter timeline doesn't give the Iraqi government sufficient opportunity to achieve stability before our departure.
But what is Obama to do? If he gives in to the prevailing military view, he will make only token drawdowns before the December 2011 deadline. This will keep us on a crushing Iraq spending trajectory of $10 billion per month for the next two years and make it very hard to send additional troops to Afghanistan.
Further, the fractious nature of Iraqi domestic politics holds out little hope for the emergence of a stable democracy, given just one more year of breathing room. Because of the destruction wrought by our capricious invasion in 2003, decades will be needed to find and sustain some kind of normal political life in Iraq.
So overall, the ultra-cautious approach toward Iraq will leave Obama holding the bag in 2012 - an election year - when the final withdrawal of American forces may well see an upsurge in violence between Iraqis and the onset of external military interventions anyway. How good could this possibly be for Obama's re-election campaign, with him running against the backdrop of an Iraq once more in flames?
Clearly, Obama needs to find a new course. Call it "the change we need" in our Iraq policy. Perhaps it can follow the lines of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton's recent comments about "smart power," a term she uses to describe the skillful blending of force and statecraft.
The military portion of this strategy could look something like this: U.S. forces draw down at the pace that Obama promised, but they would not "leave the cities," as called for in the status of forces agreement. The network of small outposts would remain in place, keeping a strong deterrent to violence in place.
Though the Pentagon has not been very forthcoming about this matter, many of us have been working hard behind the scenes to make the case for keeping the outposts manned - and it appears that our troops will stay in them well beyond July 2009.
As the entire outpost network requires less than 10 percent of total U.S. forces in Iraq - including those in place and those who support the outposts - deep overall force drawdowns can be made without undue risk.
The larger military question will revolve around what to do in 2012.
By drawing down but keeping the outpost network, Obama would by then be able to point to the years of calm in Iraq that his policy had enabled. Having largely lived up to his promise to withdraw most U.S. troops swiftly, he could, if the situation demanded it, also make the case for keeping a small American footprint in Iraq for a longer period, to deter civil war or outside military intervention.
But to reduce the risk of having to stay in Iraq beyond 2011, the president should couple the drawdown/outpost strategy with vigorous diplomacy designed to bring all the regional players to the table.
For there can be no real peace in Iraq until: 1) the Turks and Kurds have reached an existential understanding of their joint future; and 2) the Iranians can be persuaded to serve as a force for stability rather than unrest.
On this second point, a key "smart power" play would be for the Obama administration to seize the opportunity provided by Iran's participation in a peace process to get Tehran to also renounce its nuclear ambitions - perhaps in return for an American pledge to refrain from trying to effect regime change in Iran.
For all the attention that Obama must give to our economic debacle, he should realize that a misstep in Iraq will gravely undermine his presidency from the outset.
SFGate
On Jan. 20, Obama inherited an occupation characterized by greatly reduced levels of violence. If he pursues any policy that leads to ratcheting up the killing once more, Republicans are sure to point out that the disaster happened on his watch. This would seemingly confirm the stereotype about Democrats being less attuned to the demands of wartime strategy.
Just what might happen? The worry among military experts in both parties is that if Obama lives up to his campaign pledge of withdrawing a brigade a month, these reductions will be a signal to the terrorists and insurgents to sharpen their knives, set their bomb timers and ramp up the level of terrorism yet again.
One intelligence estimate leaked to the public suggests that renewed Sunni-Shiite strife might see 1 million people killed, absent U.S. forces.
There are other threats as well. Turkey might see more opportunity to make incursions in northern Iraq against the Kurds.
The Iranians would be drawn to fight alongside the Shiites, while neighboring Arab countries would support the Sunnis.
Worst case: "Congo on the Tigris" - a reprise of the civil war in Africa that saw seven countries send in armies over the past decade. About 4 million people dead, mostly innocent civilians.
Obama's plan would have us out of Iraq by summer 2010 - a year and a half sooner than required under the agreement that former President George W. Bush hammered out with Baghdad before he left office. The concern is that the shorter timeline doesn't give the Iraqi government sufficient opportunity to achieve stability before our departure.
But what is Obama to do? If he gives in to the prevailing military view, he will make only token drawdowns before the December 2011 deadline. This will keep us on a crushing Iraq spending trajectory of $10 billion per month for the next two years and make it very hard to send additional troops to Afghanistan.
Further, the fractious nature of Iraqi domestic politics holds out little hope for the emergence of a stable democracy, given just one more year of breathing room. Because of the destruction wrought by our capricious invasion in 2003, decades will be needed to find and sustain some kind of normal political life in Iraq.
So overall, the ultra-cautious approach toward Iraq will leave Obama holding the bag in 2012 - an election year - when the final withdrawal of American forces may well see an upsurge in violence between Iraqis and the onset of external military interventions anyway. How good could this possibly be for Obama's re-election campaign, with him running against the backdrop of an Iraq once more in flames?
Clearly, Obama needs to find a new course. Call it "the change we need" in our Iraq policy. Perhaps it can follow the lines of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton's recent comments about "smart power," a term she uses to describe the skillful blending of force and statecraft.
The military portion of this strategy could look something like this: U.S. forces draw down at the pace that Obama promised, but they would not "leave the cities," as called for in the status of forces agreement. The network of small outposts would remain in place, keeping a strong deterrent to violence in place.
Though the Pentagon has not been very forthcoming about this matter, many of us have been working hard behind the scenes to make the case for keeping the outposts manned - and it appears that our troops will stay in them well beyond July 2009.
As the entire outpost network requires less than 10 percent of total U.S. forces in Iraq - including those in place and those who support the outposts - deep overall force drawdowns can be made without undue risk.
The larger military question will revolve around what to do in 2012.
By drawing down but keeping the outpost network, Obama would by then be able to point to the years of calm in Iraq that his policy had enabled. Having largely lived up to his promise to withdraw most U.S. troops swiftly, he could, if the situation demanded it, also make the case for keeping a small American footprint in Iraq for a longer period, to deter civil war or outside military intervention.
But to reduce the risk of having to stay in Iraq beyond 2011, the president should couple the drawdown/outpost strategy with vigorous diplomacy designed to bring all the regional players to the table.
For there can be no real peace in Iraq until: 1) the Turks and Kurds have reached an existential understanding of their joint future; and 2) the Iranians can be persuaded to serve as a force for stability rather than unrest.
On this second point, a key "smart power" play would be for the Obama administration to seize the opportunity provided by Iran's participation in a peace process to get Tehran to also renounce its nuclear ambitions - perhaps in return for an American pledge to refrain from trying to effect regime change in Iran.
For all the attention that Obama must give to our economic debacle, he should realize that a misstep in Iraq will gravely undermine his presidency from the outset.
SFGate
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