.Facts paint a different picture of Britain's role in Iraq
With a few months to go before British Forces withdraw from Iraq, a fierce debate is under way over the legacy of Britain's six-year military engagement in the country.
The British military is determined that when the last soldier goes he will leave with his head held high and the Army's reputation intact. According to Lieutenant-General John Cooper, Britain deserves praise for helping to turn around what seemed a hopeless campaign into one where Iraq now enjoys a functioning democratic government and improving security.
Unfortunately, history offers a less flattering conclusion.
The British went into Iraq confident that their counter-insurgency experience in Northern Ireland and elsewhere was perfectly suited to the post-invasion occupation. At first their confidence seemed well founded. British troops moved quickly to adopt a sensitive approach to their operations, unlike their American allies, who used heavy-handed methods to quell an intensifying insurgency in the north.
As violence spread to southern Iraq, the British were found wanting. They had neither the troops, the equipment nor the political support from London to fight a campaign, establish security and begin real reconstruction work.
When British forces withdrew from their headquarters at Basra Palace in the summer of 2007, they effectively relinquished control of Iraq's second city to Shia militias supported by Iran. At the same time, the Americans embarked on a “surge”, with 30,000 reinforcements deployed in some of the most dangerous areas of the country.
The critical test of Britain's commitment to Iraq came the next year when Nouri al-Maliki, the Prime Minister, ordered a military offensive to restore control of Basra.
The campaign began badly and government forces looked likely to lose. It was at this point that Iraqi reinforcements backed by American advisers and air power flew to Basra and turned the battle around. The militias were routed and security restored to Basra.
The British commander at the time was on holiday. His deputy was kept out of the operations by Mr al-Maliki. It took five days for British troops to become involved, by when the Iraqis and Americans had done much of the work.
Many British soldiers, not least the SAS operating in Baghdad, served with great courage and distinction in Iraq, often with little support from the public and politicians back home. But trying to depict Britain's role as a success is gross misrepresentation. Only if the British military and Government face the facts honestly will they learn from their mistakes.
TimesOnline
The British military is determined that when the last soldier goes he will leave with his head held high and the Army's reputation intact. According to Lieutenant-General John Cooper, Britain deserves praise for helping to turn around what seemed a hopeless campaign into one where Iraq now enjoys a functioning democratic government and improving security.
Unfortunately, history offers a less flattering conclusion.
The British went into Iraq confident that their counter-insurgency experience in Northern Ireland and elsewhere was perfectly suited to the post-invasion occupation. At first their confidence seemed well founded. British troops moved quickly to adopt a sensitive approach to their operations, unlike their American allies, who used heavy-handed methods to quell an intensifying insurgency in the north.
As violence spread to southern Iraq, the British were found wanting. They had neither the troops, the equipment nor the political support from London to fight a campaign, establish security and begin real reconstruction work.
When British forces withdrew from their headquarters at Basra Palace in the summer of 2007, they effectively relinquished control of Iraq's second city to Shia militias supported by Iran. At the same time, the Americans embarked on a “surge”, with 30,000 reinforcements deployed in some of the most dangerous areas of the country.
The critical test of Britain's commitment to Iraq came the next year when Nouri al-Maliki, the Prime Minister, ordered a military offensive to restore control of Basra.
The campaign began badly and government forces looked likely to lose. It was at this point that Iraqi reinforcements backed by American advisers and air power flew to Basra and turned the battle around. The militias were routed and security restored to Basra.
The British commander at the time was on holiday. His deputy was kept out of the operations by Mr al-Maliki. It took five days for British troops to become involved, by when the Iraqis and Americans had done much of the work.
Many British soldiers, not least the SAS operating in Baghdad, served with great courage and distinction in Iraq, often with little support from the public and politicians back home. But trying to depict Britain's role as a success is gross misrepresentation. Only if the British military and Government face the facts honestly will they learn from their mistakes.
TimesOnline
posted by madtom at 10:32 PM
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