.Petraeus Wins in Iraq Battle, Kills Iran War
The departure of Adm. William J. ("Fox") Fallon gives us a rare insight into a secret world of relationships between the highest-ranking general officers and their civilian masters. This is a world in which only two dozen or so three-and four-star officers get regular face time with the civilian bosses in meetings and video-teleconferences. There's the chairman, the chiefs of the services, some Joint Staff deputies, the combatant commanders, general officers serving in the White House, and a few special assistants.
There's lots of disagreement and friction over policies and resources among the group, there are fierce personality disputes, and officers ferociously defend their turf. But one doesn't become a member of this group unless there is basic agreement about the strategic thrust.
In the end, Fallon ended up as an outlier on virtually every aspect of his portfolio: Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran. I argued yesterday that he was put into an impossible position -- theater commander but not really in charge, and at odds with the White House (though not necessarily with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates) over Iran. Eventually, in the words of one Pentagon official, Fallon became what is called a "hall walker," with less and less responsibility and little to do.
The scuttlebutt in the Pentagon, though, is that ultimately it wasn't just his dissent or his big mouth that sealed Fallon's fate. It was also that in this hyper-hierarchical world, where the supremacy of the "commander" is taken to almost fetishistic extremes, Fallon faced an untenable job: There was an officer under his command who effectively outranked him, one who had a direct pipeline to the president, and one who in his own imperious fantasy started the ball rolling to destroy his uncooperative boss.
The man most responsible for the departure of Fallon is Gen. David Petraeus, commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, the savior of the war and the Bush administration with the surge, the counter-insurgency genius, the Washington-savvy Princeton grad, and a pretty boy called "King David" by many. His boss in the military is Fallon, commander of the Central Command, but from day one of his assignment to Iraq, Petraeus reported directly to the White House, thus circumventing the chain of command and virtually ignoring the views of his superior officer.
As my friend Fred Kaplan reports in Slate: "It is well-known that Fallon has long been at odds with Gen. David Petraeus.... I have heard from several sources that the two men dislike each other and that their disagreements have been tense, sometimes fierce."
Yesterday, I was hearing from Pentagon officials, high-ranking military officers and close observers of the building that the two were at odds on virtually every element of Iraq policy, which of course put Fallon on a collision course with the White House. In other words, Iran was the excuse but Iraq was the reason: Fallon thought that the Iraq war was a dead end and a drain on resources, that the surge should brought to a quick and successful conclusion, and that the drawdowns should continue. But most important, Fallon argued at the highest level that Petraeus was just not going to get everything he wanted, according to individuals privy to the fights.
But then Petraeus had the White House and Fallon, despite his command and authority to set priorities and decide on what resources are needed, was frozen out.
A senior officer in theater sent me an e-mail: "Petraeus has accomplished a great deal, but he is very reluctant to get rid of force structure." This officer writes that the political imperative to withdraw has become virtually overwhelming. "I think Gates, the Army, and Fallon are all pressing" Petraeus to give up more resources, he writes, but so far Petraeus is winning the battle.
My take is that Bush has voted with Petraeus and has decided to tough it out with 130,000-140,000 troops in Iraq through the end of the administration. Fallon lost the battle. The good news is that with those kinds of resources being committed to Iraq, and with the lessons of the war, the likelihood of Bush and Cheney starting an Iran war is virtually zero.
WaPo, Blog
There's lots of disagreement and friction over policies and resources among the group, there are fierce personality disputes, and officers ferociously defend their turf. But one doesn't become a member of this group unless there is basic agreement about the strategic thrust.
In the end, Fallon ended up as an outlier on virtually every aspect of his portfolio: Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran. I argued yesterday that he was put into an impossible position -- theater commander but not really in charge, and at odds with the White House (though not necessarily with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates) over Iran. Eventually, in the words of one Pentagon official, Fallon became what is called a "hall walker," with less and less responsibility and little to do.
The scuttlebutt in the Pentagon, though, is that ultimately it wasn't just his dissent or his big mouth that sealed Fallon's fate. It was also that in this hyper-hierarchical world, where the supremacy of the "commander" is taken to almost fetishistic extremes, Fallon faced an untenable job: There was an officer under his command who effectively outranked him, one who had a direct pipeline to the president, and one who in his own imperious fantasy started the ball rolling to destroy his uncooperative boss.
The man most responsible for the departure of Fallon is Gen. David Petraeus, commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, the savior of the war and the Bush administration with the surge, the counter-insurgency genius, the Washington-savvy Princeton grad, and a pretty boy called "King David" by many. His boss in the military is Fallon, commander of the Central Command, but from day one of his assignment to Iraq, Petraeus reported directly to the White House, thus circumventing the chain of command and virtually ignoring the views of his superior officer.
As my friend Fred Kaplan reports in Slate: "It is well-known that Fallon has long been at odds with Gen. David Petraeus.... I have heard from several sources that the two men dislike each other and that their disagreements have been tense, sometimes fierce."
Yesterday, I was hearing from Pentagon officials, high-ranking military officers and close observers of the building that the two were at odds on virtually every element of Iraq policy, which of course put Fallon on a collision course with the White House. In other words, Iran was the excuse but Iraq was the reason: Fallon thought that the Iraq war was a dead end and a drain on resources, that the surge should brought to a quick and successful conclusion, and that the drawdowns should continue. But most important, Fallon argued at the highest level that Petraeus was just not going to get everything he wanted, according to individuals privy to the fights.
But then Petraeus had the White House and Fallon, despite his command and authority to set priorities and decide on what resources are needed, was frozen out.
A senior officer in theater sent me an e-mail: "Petraeus has accomplished a great deal, but he is very reluctant to get rid of force structure." This officer writes that the political imperative to withdraw has become virtually overwhelming. "I think Gates, the Army, and Fallon are all pressing" Petraeus to give up more resources, he writes, but so far Petraeus is winning the battle.
My take is that Bush has voted with Petraeus and has decided to tough it out with 130,000-140,000 troops in Iraq through the end of the administration. Fallon lost the battle. The good news is that with those kinds of resources being committed to Iraq, and with the lessons of the war, the likelihood of Bush and Cheney starting an Iran war is virtually zero.
WaPo, Blog
posted by madtom at 11:29 PM
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