Thursday, August 17, 2006

Officers examine risks of Iraq war

CARLISLE, Pa. - One by one, the senior U.S. Army officers spoke out about their anxiety and frustration over what the Iraq war was doing to the military.

In a freewheeling round-table discussion at the Army's venerable war college -- remarkably candid because the participants were guaranteed anonymity -- these officers on the way up the ranks spoke of their sense of duty and desire for victory. But the warriors, many of them veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan, also worried that without a clear strategy from the top and commitment of resources, the military's role in the war on terror and its future as a viable institution are in danger of being compromised.

The colonels and lieutenant colonels had specific criticisms: lack of strategy, top civilian leaders who could not admit mistakes, standards lowered to meet recruitment goals, a war conducted ``on the cheap'' with soldiers paying the consequences.

One colonel in the National Guard, a recruiter in the South, said he was concerned about several new officers he knew were heading to Iraq.

``I'm worried about three or four of them,'' he said. ``I'm worried they'll get somebody killed.''

The 16 men and women were among 326 officers finishing a demanding two-year program at the U.S. Army War College, about to receive a master's degree in strategic studies. It's a course of study that every future general must complete.

For the first time, the War College invited several non-military participants to the program for its final week. A Secret Service agent, a defense consultant and this reporter joined one seminar group of 16 officers. The ground rules: Free expression was encouraged, but individuals could not be named.

Leadership institution

Steeped in history and tradition, the War College is part of the Carlisle Barracks in central Pennsylvania, the Army's second-oldest post after West Point. George Washington reviewed troops here in 1794. During the Civil War, Confederate cavalry swept through Carlisle before the battle in nearby Gettysburg.

The War College, described by the Army as its ``premier institution'' for leadership training, has tried to foster self-examination, critical analysis and academic rigor.

In recent years, its historians have published sharp critiques of the Iraq war and the U.S. strategy to combat terrorism.

``I get sensitive hearing we just give the administration line, because that's far from the truth -- we listen to all sides,'' said Clayton Chun, a retired Air Force officer who heads the ``distance program'' for officers who complete much of their studies online.

Most of the 16 officers in one seminar group are now in the Guard or Reserve. About half served in Afghanistan or Iraq, and several are prepared to go back. Most are conservative to moderate in their politics, said one lieutenant colonel in a Midwest Guard unit who named Ronald Reagan as his hero.

``We all have different experiences and, in Iraq, you had to be innovative to deal with situations,'' said the lieutenant colonel, who served in an intelligence unit in Iraq. ``I think that carried over to this program, and we're all pretty outspoken.''

A few members of the seminar were hopeful about the war, and reflected the Army's can-do credo that serious problems are ``challenges'' to be overcome.

``We're there. We have to win,'' one Guard colonel said.

Officers spoke with pride about their Iraq service and the Army's ability to adapt its tactics to a messy insurgency.

But some of those same officers criticized the Pentagon's civilian leadership, especially Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, for bad planning, haphazard strategy and not providing the forces, training and equipment to get the job done.

``I don't think Rumsfeld or the president can admit the mistakes they made,'' said one former special-forces soldier, now a colonel in the Reserve, who served in Afghanistan and Iraq. His paper for the program was titled ``Nobody's in Charge of the War on Terrorism.''

He argued that the Army is proficient at after-action reviews and ``lessons learned'' reports to avoid repeating mistakes, but that civilian leaders had not faced the same accountability.

Addressing mistakes

A couple of officers said Rumsfeld would never admit that Gen. Eric Shinseki, former chief of staff of the Army, was right when he called for a much higher force level, ``several hundred thousand troops,'' to stabilize Iraq.

In the same buildings where Dwight Eisenhower, William Westmoreland and Norman Schwarzkopf studied past wars, today's officers worry that the Iraq experience may erode the integrity of the Army, so carefully rebuilt after Vietnam.

The recruiter from the South said he does not want to ``compromise standards'' on recruits, ``but I get beaten up over that by some higher-ups.

``We're doing cheetah leaps to get our numbers up,'' he said. ``Is the nation really on a war footing? I don't think so.''

The officers' candor and anxiety over public support for the war may be ``because being in the Guard and Reserve means they're more attuned to American society in some respects,'' Chun said.

These Army officers, like retired generals who have criticized the Iraq strategy, can speak forcefully ``because the Army is taking such a hit from the Iraq fiasco, and they know it's not their fault,'' said Judith Stiehm, who wrote a book on the Army War College in 1998.

Michael O'Hanlon, a military analyst with the Brookings Institution, said the War College is showing that it can welcome critical analysis of Iraq -- up to a point.

``There has been a lot of debate about tactics, counterinsurgency techniques, how to maximize the prospects for success,'' O'Hanlon said. ``But you're not going to see a lot of second-guessing about whether we should be in Iraq, though I do hear some doubts about that now in the Army.''

In an effort to hear different points of view, the War College brought in Middle East experts and foreign journalists, including a reporter from China's People's Daily.

On the last day of the program before graduation, officers heard from an Iraqi general, Nasier Abadi. He mixed optimism with realism about ``our problems'' and left a Vietnam-era question hanging in the air: ``I ask you to remain steady in your purpose. Do you see a light at the end of the tunnel?''

After that session, a Guard colonel who served in Iraq said he found Abadi ``impressive.'' Then he paused and added, ``I wonder if they had South Vietnamese generals here years ago who were also impressive.''

Mercury News

have these people ever thought of getting a blog?

They are welcome to come here, anonymity is guaranteed.

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