.Outside View: Hard truths on Iraq
WASHINGTON, DC, United States (UPI) -- There are no good strategic options in Iraq, and there is a serious risk of failure regardless of the policies the United States pursues.
The United States also has increasingly limited options. Iraq is now in control of its own political destiny and Iraqi leaders and politicians will choose its strategy. They can be influenced and pressured to some extent, but only at the risk of a hostile or opposite reaction. They too have limited options. Like the United States, they must try to make the current political process work, or see the nation devolve into a far more intense form of civil war.
This does not mean, however, that the United States lacks options for action. The options may not offer easy ways out, or certain probabilities of success, but there are many things the United States can do.
It will take political courage in an election year, and in dealing with a war which is already unpopular and where a majority of the American people no longer trusts the president or Congress, but one key to success is to admit that this really is a long-term engagement.
Iraq can`t be 'fixed' quickly. It can only be placed in an even worse position by premature U.S. disengagement. Iraq cannot really hope to reshape its constitution and political process and establish effective governance throughout the country for at least two years, and this effort could easily have cycles of success and failure that take half a decade.
No matter what happens, the United States must be deeply engaged in Iraq and in the Gulf for at least the next two decades. It simply cannot exit from a strategic situation involving more than 60 percent of the world`s proven oil reserves and some 40 percent of its gas, and where the United States and global economy are dependent on steadily increasing the flow of some 17 million barrels of oil a day through the Strait of Hormuz.
The United States may well be able to reduce its troop presence in Iraq, and it may even be forced to leave and seek to influence Iraq from the outside. It cannot, however, 'exit' in any meaningful sense. One way or another, it must try to make Iraq succeed for years, if not a decade, to come. It also cannot abandon Iraq without appearing to be defeated by Islamic extremism and asymmetric methods of war, and without being seen as abandoning some 28 million people it pledged to rescue from tyranny. The U.S. bull is seen throughout the world as having broken the china shop it claimed to rescue. It must now live with the political and strategic consequences.
It is time for the Bush administration to stop trying to spin the war in Iraq into images of turning points and success and address the real issues. Leadership must consist of honest, frank admissions of risk and cost, and of plans that are based on half a decade, and not the false image of easy ways out. At this point in time, political manipulators and 'spin artists' like Karl Rove are becoming a threat that unconsciously supports the Iraqi insurgents. They breed distrust and anger and preach to a steadily diminishing minority of the 'converted.'
The U.S. Congress needs the same honesty. Republican members need to face the same realities as the Bush administration, and Democratic members need to stop talking about impossible strategies and easy exits, as if Iraq`s fate somehow did not have strategic importance. Congress has been no more honest as a body than the Bush administration, and only a few members have truly sought bipartisan solutions that will serve the national interest. Partisan spin and opportunism is as much a threat to the United States as spin within the administration. Like President George W. Bush, Congress is more of a threat than the insurgency.
The U.S. military and senior U.S. officials also need to stop 'cheerleading' and spinning the facts on the ground. The leaders must present the real facts and options, honestly address the risks, present a strategy for long-term involvement, and provide metrics that give an honest picture of what is happening, good and bad. Americans need to see that there are practical plans; they need to be able to trust what senior military and civilian officials say; and they need to see a case for patience that builds credibility and trust. There is a reason polls show a growing lack of confidence and support. The U.S. government simply has failed to earn it.
U.S. officials reporting on Iraq should recognize that the U.S. Embassy in Iraq, and U.S. intelligence and military officers, see many of the same problems in Iraq as the media. No one is hiding the 'good news.' Put simply, not much progress has been made, and it was never reasonable to assume progress could be quick and easy.
Instead of playing games with numbers and definitions, U.S. officials should prepare the American people and Congress for years of effort. They should communicate in ways that build enduring trust by honestly stating the problems and by providing meaningful metrics of success and failure.
U.S. leadership should reassure Iraqis and the rest of the world that the United States is addressing Iraq in real world terms, and it should put indirect pressure on Iraqis to lead, act, and succeed by highlighting their successes and failures.
(Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke chair of Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. This article is extracted from his recent CSIS paper 'Winning the Long War in Iraq: What the U.S. Can and Cannot Do.')
M&C
The United States also has increasingly limited options. Iraq is now in control of its own political destiny and Iraqi leaders and politicians will choose its strategy. They can be influenced and pressured to some extent, but only at the risk of a hostile or opposite reaction. They too have limited options. Like the United States, they must try to make the current political process work, or see the nation devolve into a far more intense form of civil war.
This does not mean, however, that the United States lacks options for action. The options may not offer easy ways out, or certain probabilities of success, but there are many things the United States can do.
It will take political courage in an election year, and in dealing with a war which is already unpopular and where a majority of the American people no longer trusts the president or Congress, but one key to success is to admit that this really is a long-term engagement.
Iraq can`t be 'fixed' quickly. It can only be placed in an even worse position by premature U.S. disengagement. Iraq cannot really hope to reshape its constitution and political process and establish effective governance throughout the country for at least two years, and this effort could easily have cycles of success and failure that take half a decade.
No matter what happens, the United States must be deeply engaged in Iraq and in the Gulf for at least the next two decades. It simply cannot exit from a strategic situation involving more than 60 percent of the world`s proven oil reserves and some 40 percent of its gas, and where the United States and global economy are dependent on steadily increasing the flow of some 17 million barrels of oil a day through the Strait of Hormuz.
The United States may well be able to reduce its troop presence in Iraq, and it may even be forced to leave and seek to influence Iraq from the outside. It cannot, however, 'exit' in any meaningful sense. One way or another, it must try to make Iraq succeed for years, if not a decade, to come. It also cannot abandon Iraq without appearing to be defeated by Islamic extremism and asymmetric methods of war, and without being seen as abandoning some 28 million people it pledged to rescue from tyranny. The U.S. bull is seen throughout the world as having broken the china shop it claimed to rescue. It must now live with the political and strategic consequences.
It is time for the Bush administration to stop trying to spin the war in Iraq into images of turning points and success and address the real issues. Leadership must consist of honest, frank admissions of risk and cost, and of plans that are based on half a decade, and not the false image of easy ways out. At this point in time, political manipulators and 'spin artists' like Karl Rove are becoming a threat that unconsciously supports the Iraqi insurgents. They breed distrust and anger and preach to a steadily diminishing minority of the 'converted.'
The U.S. Congress needs the same honesty. Republican members need to face the same realities as the Bush administration, and Democratic members need to stop talking about impossible strategies and easy exits, as if Iraq`s fate somehow did not have strategic importance. Congress has been no more honest as a body than the Bush administration, and only a few members have truly sought bipartisan solutions that will serve the national interest. Partisan spin and opportunism is as much a threat to the United States as spin within the administration. Like President George W. Bush, Congress is more of a threat than the insurgency.
The U.S. military and senior U.S. officials also need to stop 'cheerleading' and spinning the facts on the ground. The leaders must present the real facts and options, honestly address the risks, present a strategy for long-term involvement, and provide metrics that give an honest picture of what is happening, good and bad. Americans need to see that there are practical plans; they need to be able to trust what senior military and civilian officials say; and they need to see a case for patience that builds credibility and trust. There is a reason polls show a growing lack of confidence and support. The U.S. government simply has failed to earn it.
U.S. officials reporting on Iraq should recognize that the U.S. Embassy in Iraq, and U.S. intelligence and military officers, see many of the same problems in Iraq as the media. No one is hiding the 'good news.' Put simply, not much progress has been made, and it was never reasonable to assume progress could be quick and easy.
Instead of playing games with numbers and definitions, U.S. officials should prepare the American people and Congress for years of effort. They should communicate in ways that build enduring trust by honestly stating the problems and by providing meaningful metrics of success and failure.
U.S. leadership should reassure Iraqis and the rest of the world that the United States is addressing Iraq in real world terms, and it should put indirect pressure on Iraqis to lead, act, and succeed by highlighting their successes and failures.
(Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke chair of Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. This article is extracted from his recent CSIS paper 'Winning the Long War in Iraq: What the U.S. Can and Cannot Do.')
M&C
posted by madtom at 4:19 PM
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
<< Home