.Iraq: The Intra-Shiite Schism Erupts in Basra
Summary
Iraqi Shiite demonstrators, accusing an Iranian television station of slandering an Iraqi Shiite cleric, attacked the Iranian diplomatic office in the southern Iraqi city of Basra on June 14. This comes on the heels of a surge of violence in Basra regarding intra-Shiite struggles over power and control of oil. Negotiations with the Sunnis have opened up fault lines in the Shiite political landscape that could lead to a reconfiguration of the Shiite spectrum -- resulting in increased violence and insecurity which will, in turn, complicate efforts to disband Iraq's militias.
Analysis
A mob of several hundred protesters, accusing an Iranian television station of insulting prominent Shiite cleric Mahmoud al-Hasani, attacked Iran's consulate in the southern Iraqi city of Basra on June 14 and set fire to an annex of the diplomatic compound.
This is just the latest in a wave of attacks in Basra, where violence stemming from intra-Shiite rivalries over power and control of the area's oil has escalated over the past two months. Attacks on coalition forces in southern Iraq have also seen a spike during the past two months. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki declared a state of emergency in Basra on May 31 in response to "gangs" directly threatening the area's oil infrastructure and clashes between rival Shiite militias like the Badr Brigades and Muqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army.
The six-month-long power-sharing negotiations have led to the incorporation of the Sunnis into the political process, but they have also brought to the fore the cracks within the Shiite coalition. While the Sunnis are moving toward a more unified position in terms of their political goals, the Shia are headed in the opposite direction.
The Shiite fracas boils down to a tussle between mainstream forces -- represented by the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and Hizb al-Dawah (HD) -- and al-Fadhila, the No. 4 party in the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) and the dominating force in regional politics in the Basra area. Al-Sadr's movement, pursuing its own interests, cautiously backs al-Fadhila. On yet another level, the tussle involves Iranian interests; while Tehran backs the mainstream, it also maintains ties to virtually every Shiite player in Iraq.
This means the intra-Shiite rift will evolve into one between pro-Iranian Shia and Iraqi nationalist Shia. There are reports that the various Shiite factions accuse each other of being Iran's stooges. The situation is approaching the point at which the Shiite power grab is going to intensify greatly, and in this the groups will re-evaluate their positions in relation to Iran.
Iran's motive in stirring up trouble among the Iraqi Shia is to make it easier to manipulate them for Tehran's interests. Conversely, the perception that they are resisting Iran is a tool some of the Shia are using to advance their interests. There are limits to this approach because the Shia know they are not yet in a position to stand on their own.
Leading up to the Dec. 15 parliamentary elections, and until the controversy over the formation of the government, the Shiite factions united to pursue their communal interests, realizing that alone or even divided into multiple coalitions, they would have a weakened political position. In this regard, both the Iranians and the religious establishment symbolized by Iraq's top cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani played a leading role, even though Tehran and al-Sistani played the various sides off each other.
Now, the pressure to accommodate the Sunnis has cracked pre-existing fissures wide open, and the alliance of expediency is beginning to fall apart.
The first problem came when the Sunnis, Kurds and secular nationalists forced the Shia to replace Ibrahim al-Jaafari as their prime ministerial candidate; al-Fadhila was even jockeying for the premiership. That process acted as a catalyst within the Shiite community for the emergence of rifts.
Once that matter was settled, there came the issue of control of the oil ministry, which went to Hussein Shahristani, a leading independent member of the UIA and perhaps al-Sistani's closest political ally. Al-Fadhila intensely pursued the oil portfolio because of its control in the Basra region.
After al-Fadhila saw that it was not able to project itself on the national scene, it decided it was time to lock in on the regional front -- in the Basra province, where it controls the provincial government and local security apparatuses to a great degree.
The al-Sadrites, who have 32 parliamentary seats -- the largest share controlled by the Shiite bloc -- have been watching this very closely. They would love to exploit this melee between the central government and the Basra provincial government to their advantage. Al-Sadr knows that although his group is very influential in its ability to steer decisions, it does not represent the mainstream of the Shiite political spectrum. After all, the al-Sadrites are latecomers to the alliance, which has long been dominated by SCIRI and HD. The radical Shia leader would like to enhance his group's stature as a national group.
Then there is the intense rivalry between SCIRI and the al-Sadrites as manifested in the standoffs between their respective militias, the Badr Brigades and the Mehdi Army. For al-Sadr to consolidate his recent gains, he must weaken the position of SCIRI, which controls the leadership of the Shiite alliance. In this regard, al-Fadhila's petty regional politics have provided al-Sadr with a great opportunity to move ahead with his agenda.
The issue of disbanding the Shiite militias -- which the Shia must do to reciprocate to the Sunnis -- has also exacerbated the Shiite schisms. The ongoing struggle within the Shiite community will make the government's attempt to disband the militias a long, drawn-out process.
The Shiite-dominated Iraqi regime's ability to rein in the militias is the new deal-breaker. Without it, the deal with the Sunnis could fall apart. Moreover, the militias are a threat to the Shia's ability to control the oil and be able to keep a comfortable distance from Tehran. Therefore, the militia issue will eventually be dealt with; concessions are being offered to those Shiite factions that have militias. But before that happens, the country will experience a surge in violence over the issue.
Essentially, each Shiite faction is now trying to assert its partisan stance. This will lead to a re-evaluation of the Iraqi Shia's ties to Iran and hence a shift of the Iraqi Shiite political landscape. And the arena for this intra-Shiite battle for power and control of the country's southern oil fields is the city of Basra. Conventional wisdom sees the Shiite-Sunni conflict as the cause of political instability in the country, but it would appear that an intra-Shiite struggle is now at the epicenter.
Stratfor
Iraqi Shiite demonstrators, accusing an Iranian television station of slandering an Iraqi Shiite cleric, attacked the Iranian diplomatic office in the southern Iraqi city of Basra on June 14. This comes on the heels of a surge of violence in Basra regarding intra-Shiite struggles over power and control of oil. Negotiations with the Sunnis have opened up fault lines in the Shiite political landscape that could lead to a reconfiguration of the Shiite spectrum -- resulting in increased violence and insecurity which will, in turn, complicate efforts to disband Iraq's militias.
Analysis
A mob of several hundred protesters, accusing an Iranian television station of insulting prominent Shiite cleric Mahmoud al-Hasani, attacked Iran's consulate in the southern Iraqi city of Basra on June 14 and set fire to an annex of the diplomatic compound.
This is just the latest in a wave of attacks in Basra, where violence stemming from intra-Shiite rivalries over power and control of the area's oil has escalated over the past two months. Attacks on coalition forces in southern Iraq have also seen a spike during the past two months. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki declared a state of emergency in Basra on May 31 in response to "gangs" directly threatening the area's oil infrastructure and clashes between rival Shiite militias like the Badr Brigades and Muqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army.
The six-month-long power-sharing negotiations have led to the incorporation of the Sunnis into the political process, but they have also brought to the fore the cracks within the Shiite coalition. While the Sunnis are moving toward a more unified position in terms of their political goals, the Shia are headed in the opposite direction.
The Shiite fracas boils down to a tussle between mainstream forces -- represented by the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and Hizb al-Dawah (HD) -- and al-Fadhila, the No. 4 party in the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) and the dominating force in regional politics in the Basra area. Al-Sadr's movement, pursuing its own interests, cautiously backs al-Fadhila. On yet another level, the tussle involves Iranian interests; while Tehran backs the mainstream, it also maintains ties to virtually every Shiite player in Iraq.
This means the intra-Shiite rift will evolve into one between pro-Iranian Shia and Iraqi nationalist Shia. There are reports that the various Shiite factions accuse each other of being Iran's stooges. The situation is approaching the point at which the Shiite power grab is going to intensify greatly, and in this the groups will re-evaluate their positions in relation to Iran.
Iran's motive in stirring up trouble among the Iraqi Shia is to make it easier to manipulate them for Tehran's interests. Conversely, the perception that they are resisting Iran is a tool some of the Shia are using to advance their interests. There are limits to this approach because the Shia know they are not yet in a position to stand on their own.
Leading up to the Dec. 15 parliamentary elections, and until the controversy over the formation of the government, the Shiite factions united to pursue their communal interests, realizing that alone or even divided into multiple coalitions, they would have a weakened political position. In this regard, both the Iranians and the religious establishment symbolized by Iraq's top cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani played a leading role, even though Tehran and al-Sistani played the various sides off each other.
Now, the pressure to accommodate the Sunnis has cracked pre-existing fissures wide open, and the alliance of expediency is beginning to fall apart.
The first problem came when the Sunnis, Kurds and secular nationalists forced the Shia to replace Ibrahim al-Jaafari as their prime ministerial candidate; al-Fadhila was even jockeying for the premiership. That process acted as a catalyst within the Shiite community for the emergence of rifts.
Once that matter was settled, there came the issue of control of the oil ministry, which went to Hussein Shahristani, a leading independent member of the UIA and perhaps al-Sistani's closest political ally. Al-Fadhila intensely pursued the oil portfolio because of its control in the Basra region.
After al-Fadhila saw that it was not able to project itself on the national scene, it decided it was time to lock in on the regional front -- in the Basra province, where it controls the provincial government and local security apparatuses to a great degree.
The al-Sadrites, who have 32 parliamentary seats -- the largest share controlled by the Shiite bloc -- have been watching this very closely. They would love to exploit this melee between the central government and the Basra provincial government to their advantage. Al-Sadr knows that although his group is very influential in its ability to steer decisions, it does not represent the mainstream of the Shiite political spectrum. After all, the al-Sadrites are latecomers to the alliance, which has long been dominated by SCIRI and HD. The radical Shia leader would like to enhance his group's stature as a national group.
Then there is the intense rivalry between SCIRI and the al-Sadrites as manifested in the standoffs between their respective militias, the Badr Brigades and the Mehdi Army. For al-Sadr to consolidate his recent gains, he must weaken the position of SCIRI, which controls the leadership of the Shiite alliance. In this regard, al-Fadhila's petty regional politics have provided al-Sadr with a great opportunity to move ahead with his agenda.
The issue of disbanding the Shiite militias -- which the Shia must do to reciprocate to the Sunnis -- has also exacerbated the Shiite schisms. The ongoing struggle within the Shiite community will make the government's attempt to disband the militias a long, drawn-out process.
The Shiite-dominated Iraqi regime's ability to rein in the militias is the new deal-breaker. Without it, the deal with the Sunnis could fall apart. Moreover, the militias are a threat to the Shia's ability to control the oil and be able to keep a comfortable distance from Tehran. Therefore, the militia issue will eventually be dealt with; concessions are being offered to those Shiite factions that have militias. But before that happens, the country will experience a surge in violence over the issue.
Essentially, each Shiite faction is now trying to assert its partisan stance. This will lead to a re-evaluation of the Iraqi Shia's ties to Iran and hence a shift of the Iraqi Shiite political landscape. And the arena for this intra-Shiite battle for power and control of the country's southern oil fields is the city of Basra. Conventional wisdom sees the Shiite-Sunni conflict as the cause of political instability in the country, but it would appear that an intra-Shiite struggle is now at the epicenter.
Stratfor
posted by madtom at 6:40 PM
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