.Assessment of the War in Iraq
Col. Chet Richards is a retired Air Force intelligence and Middle East expert. He has written extensively on the thinking of the American strategist John Boyd, especially in two monographs published by the Straus Military Reform Project and the Center for Defense Information (The Swift Elusive Sword and Neither Shall the Sword). On May 25, 2006, Richards presented to the press his analysis of why the war in Iraq continues to go so poorly, and why the war is now lost, and – indeed – has been lost from the start. In summary, Richards points out that President George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld have addressed every element of what constitutes “grand strategy,” but, unfortunately, for each component, they got it exactly wrong: their actions have weakened, not built up, American morale and support for the war; they have helped enemies pump up their own morale and motivation; they have fractured the alliances of the United States with traditional partners while at the same time facilitating the enemies’ cohesion, and they have failed to win over, if not actually alienate, many of those who were neutral to America’s cause - while in some respects making all too many of the uncommitted sympathetic to elements of the enemies’ cause.
Col. Douglas Macgregor is a decorated veteran of the first Gulf War in 1991 and the author of Breaking the Phalanx and Transformation Under Fire, which many in the Army have adopted as a guidebook for meaningful reform. In his presentation, Macgregor argued that the American failures in Iraq have been at both the strategic and operational levels. Both Rumsfeld and Bush failed to recognize or act on realities in Iraq and instead acted based on ill-informed, preconceived notions – a finding
Richards shares. Moreover, the U.S. Army’s leadership failed to oppose fundamentally unrealistic directives, and it did not carry out operations in a manner optimized for strategic and operational success. Indeed, the very nature of the American occupation of Iraq has become the primary source of the opposition to it and the very reason why it will fail. Macgregor concludes that it seems both the Army and America’s political leaders have learned nothing from their failures and remain poised to repeat the experience in a future conflict – whether initiated by the United States or others.
Both of these unhappy, professional assessments observe – contrary to prevailing conventional wisdom among critics – which a larger American military presence in Iraq now or in 2003 would certainly not have avoided the problems the United States encountered, and both imply a continuation of all the undesirable trends – not a graceful exit – as long as the American occupation of Iraq continues.
CDI
Col. Douglas Macgregor is a decorated veteran of the first Gulf War in 1991 and the author of Breaking the Phalanx and Transformation Under Fire, which many in the Army have adopted as a guidebook for meaningful reform. In his presentation, Macgregor argued that the American failures in Iraq have been at both the strategic and operational levels. Both Rumsfeld and Bush failed to recognize or act on realities in Iraq and instead acted based on ill-informed, preconceived notions – a finding
Richards shares. Moreover, the U.S. Army’s leadership failed to oppose fundamentally unrealistic directives, and it did not carry out operations in a manner optimized for strategic and operational success. Indeed, the very nature of the American occupation of Iraq has become the primary source of the opposition to it and the very reason why it will fail. Macgregor concludes that it seems both the Army and America’s political leaders have learned nothing from their failures and remain poised to repeat the experience in a future conflict – whether initiated by the United States or others.
Both of these unhappy, professional assessments observe – contrary to prevailing conventional wisdom among critics – which a larger American military presence in Iraq now or in 2003 would certainly not have avoided the problems the United States encountered, and both imply a continuation of all the undesirable trends – not a graceful exit – as long as the American occupation of Iraq continues.
CDI
posted by madtom at 11:18 AM
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